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Law for the Platform Economy
Julie E. Cohen*
This Article explores patterns of legal-institutional change in the
emerging, platform-driven economy. Its starting premise is that the
platform is not simply a new business model, a new social technology, or a
new infrastructural formation (although it is also all of those things).
Rather, it is the core organizational form of the emerging informational
economy. Platforms do not enter or expand markets; they replace (and
rematerialize) them. The article argues that legal institutions, including
both entitlements and regulatory institutions, have systematically
facilitated the platform economy’s emergence. It first describes the
evolution of the platform as a mode of economic (re)organization and
introduces the ways that platforms restructure both economic exchange
and patterns of information flow more generally. It then explores some of
the ways that actions and interventions by and on behalf of platform
businesses are reshaping the landscape of legal entitlements and
obligations. Finally, it describes challenges that platform-based
intermediation of the information environment has posed for existing
regulatory institutions and traces some of the emerging institutional
responses.
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Platforms are big news and big business — and, some would say, the
focus of overblown and unwarranted hype. Books by business scholars
and tech-economy pundits tout the efficiency and generativity of
platform-based business models, even though new platform ventures
often struggle to turn profits after moving out of the startup phase.
Tech journalists, activists, and scholars in a variety of academic fields
argue that platforms are reshaping seemingly every area of human
endeavor, from innovation to commerce to cultural production to
social organization, but disagree on how to assess platforms’ effects.
This Article takes claims about the transformativeness of platforms
seriously and considers their implications for law. Its starting premise
is that the platform is not simply a new business model, a new social
technology, or a new infrastructural formation (although it is also all
of those things). Rather, it is the core organizational form of the
emerging informational economy.
In the book in progress from which this Article is adapted, I frame the
emergence of informational capitalism in terms of three large-scale
developments that parallel those identified by political economist Karl
Polanyi as framing the emergence of industrial capitalism.1 Polanyi
mapped a “great transformation” in the system of political economy that
involved appropriation of newly important resources but that also
moved on conceptual and organizational levels. The basic factors of
industrial production — land, labor, and money — were
reconceptualized as commodities, while at the same time patterns of
barter and exchange became detached from local communities and
reembedded in the constructed mechanism of the market.2 Three
analogous shifts frame the transformation that is now underway: the
propertization of intangible resources, the concurrent dematerialization
and datafication of the basic factors of industrial production, and the
embedding of patterns of barter and exchange within information
platforms. Organizationally speaking, the platform is key: platforms do
not enter or expand markets; they replace (and rematerialize) them.
1 JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM (forthcoming). For a concise definition of informational
capitalism, see MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INFORMATION AGE: THE RISE OF THE NETWORK
SOCIETY 14-18 (1996). For helpful discussions of various manifestations of the shift
from industrialism to informationalism as the dominant mode of economic
development, see generally DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A
VENTURE IN SOCIAL FORECASTING (1973); JAMES R. BENIGER, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION:
TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1986); DAN
SCHILLER, HOW TO THINK ABOUT INFORMATION 3-35 (2007).
2 See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 33-76 (Beacon Press 2d ed. 2001) (1944).
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And platforms, unlike the fictional “market,” have taken shape as
discrete legal entities, with their own aims and agendas.
The role of law in this story is foundational but largely unremarked.
Legal scholars who work on information policy have been intensely
concerned with questions about how existing doctrinal and regulatory
frameworks should apply to information, databases, technical
protocols, and online behavior, perhaps undergoing some changes in
coverage or emphasis along the way. For the most part, they have not
asked the broader, reflexive questions about how core legal
institutions are already evolving in response to the ongoing
transformation in our political economy — questions, in other words,
not about how law should apply to disputes over information, but
rather about how disputes over information are reshaping the
enterprise of law at the institutional level. That is a mistake. Law for
the platform economy is already being written — not via discrete,
purposive changes, but rather via the ordinary, uncoordinated but selfinterested efforts of information-economy participants and the lawyers
and lobbyists they employ.
Part I describes the evolution of the platform as a mode of economic
(re)organization and introduces the ways that platforms restructure
both economic exchange and patterns of information flow more
generally. Part II explores some of the ways that actions and
interventions by and on behalf of platform businesses are reshaping
the landscape of legal entitlements and obligations. Part III describes
challenges that platform-based intermediation of the information
environment has posed for existing regulatory institutions and traces
some of the emerging institutional responses. Part IV concludes and
suggests some lessons for the project of “future-proofing law.”
I.

FROM MARKETS TO PLATFORMS

In the industrial-era economy, the locus for activities of barter and
exchange was the market, an idealized site of encounter between
buyers and sellers within which the characteristics, quantities, and
prices of goods and services were regulated autonomically by the laws
of supply and demand. In the emerging informational economy, the
locus for those activities is the platform, a site of encounter where
interactions are materially and algorithmically intermediated.
Platforms — including online marketplaces, desktop and mobile
computing environments, social networks, virtual labor exchanges,
payment systems, trading systems, and many, many more — have
become the sites of ever-increasing amounts of economic activity and
also of ever-increasing amounts of social and cultural activity. The
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emergence of platform-based business models has reshaped work,
finance, information transmission, entertainment, social interaction,
and consumption of goods and services, and has destabilized the
locally embedded systems that previously mediated those activities in
many different types of communities. Legal and economic constructs
based on the idea of “markets” — whether in goods and services or in
speech and ideas — have yet to adapt in response.
A. Prologue: Access and Legibility
No form of economic or social organization is ever wholly new.
Preexisting modes of organization impose their own logics, and pathdependencies matter. It is important to begin by recognizing two
important ways in which platforms represent continuity. The
intertwined functions that platforms provide — intermediation that
provides would-be counterparties with access to one another and
techniques for rendering users legible to those seeking to market goods
and services to them — have important antecedents in twentiethcentury direct marketing and advertising practices.
To understand the pre-history of platforms, it is useful to consider
two early precursors: the Sears, Roebuck catalog and the Nielsen
ratings system. Over two decades at the turn of the twentieth century,
entrepreneurs Richard Sears and Alvah Curtis Roebuck parlayed a
mail-order watch and jewelry business into a wildly successful mailorder empire selling everything from jewelry to farm equipment.
Inclusion of a product in the Sears, Roebuck catalog gave its
manufacturer access to a marketing juggernaut with the ability to
reach consumers nationwide, the range to offer concert grant pianos
and engraved shotguns, and the power to undercut the prices charged
by local “five-and-ten-cent stores” for everyday essentials.3 Three
decades later, Arthur Nielsen, a pioneer in the field of statistical
market research, began to develop a system designed to give
subscribing advertisers and their clients a different kind of access to
consumers, based on aggregate measurements rather than solely on
one-way communication. The system originated as a simple
“audimeter” that recorded when household radios were on and the
stations to which they were tuned; over time, the company expanded
to television and developed techniques for correlating the recorded
information with demographic information and individual viewing
information collected from participating households via paper
3 See BORIS EMMET & JOHN E. JUECK, CATALOGUES
SEARS, ROEBUCK AND COMPANY 59-99, 100-13 (1950).
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“diaries.”4 In this manner, it gradually began to develop more granular
profiles of the viewing population.
Both the Sears, Roebuck catalog and the Nielsen ratings system
provided access to vast pools of consumers, but the ways they
provided access and the relationships they envisioned between and
among manufacturers, intermediaries, and consumers were different.
To use Dan Bouk’s periodization, the catalog represents the era of the
ideal customer as social imaginary. Sears, Roebuck & Co. lacked and
likely could not imagine collecting precise, granular information about
customer desires and resources, so it sold products it envisioned
customers as wanting.5 To the extent that measurements factored into
those determinations, they did so as proxies for the ideal customer
rather than as empirical representations of any particular customer.
The Nielsen system represents the era of the mass audience,
constructed on the basis of numerical aggregates that purported to
represent the audience itself.6 The era of the mass audience also
represents a critical inflection point, in which the legibility rubric
supplied by an intermediary became both an object of regularized
economic exchange and an increasingly powerful, institutionalized
arbiter of the knowledge upon which market participants relied.
Legibility here connotes more than simple visibility; legibility rubrics
incorporate both implicit epistemologies and associated action
strategies. Like other such rubrics — for example, the charts and
tables on which modern administrators rely to govern populations or
the nodes and landmarks on which city dwellers rely to create
cognitive maps of their surroundings7 — the Nielsen ratings did not
simply represent the mass audience but also encoded both a way of
understanding it and strategies for managing it.
Platforms echo some aspects of these early precursors, but also
rework the basic themes of access and legibility in ways that neither
4 See HUGH MALCOLM BEVILLE, JR., AUDIENCE RATINGS: RADIO, TELEVISION, CABLE
34-38, 70-75 (2d rev. ed. 1988); JOSEPH TUROW, BREAKING UP AMERICA: ADVERTISERS
AND THE NEW MEDIA WORLD 24-32 (1997).
5 See EMMET & JUECK, supra note 3, at 39-40; Dan Bouk, The History and Political
Economy of Personal Data over the Last Two Centuries in Three Acts, 32 OSIRIS
(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 11-13) (on file with author).
6 See Bouk, supra note 5, at 12-16. On television ratings as a technology of power,
see generally IEN ANG, DESPERATELY SEEKING THE AUDIENCE 53-57 (1991).
7 For foundational explications of the ways that legibility rubrics both assist and
distort understanding in the contexts of state administration and urban planning, see
generally KEVIN LYNCH, THE IMAGE OF THE CITY (1960); JAMES SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A
STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES FOR IMPROVING THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED
(1998).
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Richard Sears nor Arthur Nielsen could have envisioned. Selection of
one’s product for inclusion in the Sears, Roebuck catalog might have
offered a ticket to marketplace success, but it was not essential for
economic survival in an era in which much commerce remained local.
Many manufacturers, moreover, refused the opportunity because of
the production quantities demanded or because they feared that local
retailers who opposed the spread of mail-order businesses would
boycott their wares.8 Access to basic communications infrastructures
— the postal system and print advertising distributed via newspapers
and magazines — was becoming more nearly essential for survival, but
the relevant infrastructures were available to (almost) anyone willing
and able to pay the required fees. As the relevant infrastructures —
now digital and networked — have become platforms, both the
conditions of access and the need for access have changed. Access to
the facilities offered by Amazon or Google or Visa/Mastercard or the
iOS operating system, for example, requires assent to complex sets of
legal and technical protocols. And access to platforms — whether
online marketplaces or search engines or payment systems or
computing environments — is increasingly essential to reaching any
customers at all.
The story of legibility is more complicated still. In the late 1980s,
proprietary infrastructures for radio and television broadcast began to
give way to a far more complex ecosystem that included proprietary
infrastructures for cable television and Internet access and open
protocols for Internet publishing. The proliferation of cable channels
and home video recording technologies initially caused an existential
crisis for advertisers, whose aggregate measures of the mass audience
and its tastes began to dissolve into seemingly unmanageable
fragments.9 That fragmentation, however, also lent momentum to
practices of targeted marketing that had originated earlier in the
twentieth century, and that were premised on the importance of
reaching specialized pools of desirable consumers.10 New technologies
for networked digital communication were emerging, and efforts to
adapt those technologies for commercial exploitation ultimately
produced new, highly granular ways of measuring audiences and
predicting audience appeal.11

8
9
10
11

See EMMET & JUECK, supra note 3, at 117-19, 150-68.
See ANG, supra note 6, at 68-77.
See TUROW, supra note 4, at 27-36.
See Bouk, supra note 5, at 17-20.
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At the same time, and reflecting the increasing normative force of
legibility as an overarching frame for commercial endeavor, the
legibility function began to burrow into the core of the infrastructure
itself. The emergence of the commercial Internet, with its enormous
number and variety of information sources, accelerated the centripetal
movement. A world with a vast diversity of information sources
required intermediation for those sources to be meaningfully
accessible, and legibility became the essential function for an
intermediary to provide to advertisers seeking access to users.
B. How Platforms Shape Information Flow, part 1: The Datafication of
Everyday Life
Reorganization around intermediation and legibility has engendered
profound structural changes in the architecture of contemporary
networked communication. Platforms emerged at a point of fortuitous
technological convergence: new techniques for customer tracking,
immersive social design, and data analysis all promised new
possibilities for profiting from targeted marketing in an increasingly
fragmented media ecosystem. As legibility became a service most
effectively and profitably provided at the infrastructural level,
however, the demands of the platform business model rapidly began to
drive infrastructure design. As a result of that shift, the everyday lives
of network users have become increasingly datafied — converted into
structured flows of data suitable for continuous collection and analysis
at the platform level.
One important technological predicate for the emergence of
platforms emerged in the mid-1990s, when researchers at the Netscape
Corporation developed the first protocol for identifying visitors to web
sites. The protocol, which involved insertion of a small piece of code
called a “cookie” into the user’s browser, enabled so-called “stateful”
interactions, such as transactions involving use of a virtual shopping
cart. Implemented in “persistent” form, it also could enable
reidentification of those users when they returned to the site later
on.12 The resulting radical democratization of surveillance capability
marks a critical inflection point in the pursuit of user legibility. Using
cookie technology, anyone with a server connected to the Internet
could become a data collector, and cookies also could be served and
collected by third parties providing hosting, payment, or marketing
services. Willingness to accept at least some kinds of cookies rapidly
12 See David M. Kristol, HTTP Cookies: Standards, Privacy, and Politics, 1 ACM
TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET TECH. 151, 152-56 (2001).
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became an increasingly necessary precondition for transacting online
and participating in online communities. In addition, marketers and
technologists in their employ developed a set of less-visible tracking
techniques, known variously as “clear GIFs” or “web bugs,” for
surreptitiously collecting information about Internet users’ behavior.13
In parallel with these developments, new platform-based
environments for social sharing and massively multiplayer gaming
were taking shape in ways that also relied on techniques for keeping
track of users. The earliest online communities were organized around
chat rooms, listservs, and communal bulletin boards, and had neither
the desire nor the capability for built-in surveillance. In the late 1990s
and early 2000s, however, the first true multimedia gaming platforms
and social networking platforms began to emerge: graphically rich,
hypertext-based environments that enabled customizable member
profiles and relied on cookies to manage login information.14
At the same time, a variety of firms — including emerging platform
firms, digital advertising specialty firms, and data brokers — were
developing new and powerful data analysis capabilities. Those
capabilities combined new configurations of information-processing
hardware capable of sifting, sorting, and interrogating vast quantities
of data in very short times with new machine learning techniques for
identifying patterns, distilling the patterns into predictions, and
continually adjusting the patterns and predictions in response to new
data.15 The result, popularized under the moniker “Big Data,” was a
technique for converting voluminous, heterogeneous flows of
physical, transactional, and behavioral information about people (or
about anything else) into a particular, highly data-intensive type of
knowledge.16
13 See Richard M. Smith, The Web Bug FAQ, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 11,
1999), https://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Marketing/web_bug.html.
14 See TRISTAN DONOVAN, REPLAY: THE HISTORY OF VIDEO GAMES 289-319 (2010);
Benjamin Hale, The History of Social Media, HISTORY COOP. (June 16, 2015), http://
historycooperative.org/the-history-of-social-media; The History of Social Networking,
DIG. TRENDS (May 14, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/features/thehistory-of-social-networking.
15 See generally Dave Feinleib, The 3 I’s of Big Data, FORBES (July 9, 2012, 4:05
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davefeinleib/2012/07/09/the-3-is-of-big-data; Jeff
Kelly, Big Data: Hadoop, Business Analytics and Beyond, WIKIBON (Feb. 5, 2014),
http://wikibon.org/wiki/v/Big_Data:_Hadoop,_Business_Analytics_and_Beyond.
16 See generally JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, BIG DATA: THE
NEXT FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY (2011); Ibrar Yaqoob
et al., Big Data: From Beginning to Future, 36 INT’L J. INFO. MGMT. 1231 (2016); Gil
Press, A Very Short History of Big Data, FORBES (May 9, 2013, 9:45 AM),
https://onforb.es/16jHac8 (last updated Dec. 21, 2013).
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The platform business model emerged as these developments
converged with one another and with the demands of capital markets.
As they moved beyond the startup phase and sought stable sources of
financing, new ventures in search, social networking, gaming, content
provision, day trading, freelance work referral, and other areas
gradually became entangled within commercial and extractive logics.
Advertisers who might provide revenue wanted results and users were
learning to value personalization. Personalized tracking and predictive
modeling seemed the logical way to satisfy both imperatives.
Although many platform-based businesses have failed, when judged
in aggregate, the platform business model is an undeniable
commercial success. Google and Facebook together now command
approximately 20% of global advertising revenue, 65% of digital
advertising revenue, and 85% of every new dollar spent on
advertising.17 The dominant platform firms — Alphabet (Google),
Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft — have a combined market
capitalization that (as of this writing) exceeds $3.5 trillion.18 Although
the dominant platform firms are all publicly traded companies, the
relationships between platform firms and private flows of finance
capital are also deep and complex.19
The commercial and extractive logics that drove emergence of the
platform business model success now impose their own design
imperatives, which demand continued evolution of the networked
information environment toward ever more pervasive intermediation

17 See Lucy Handley, Google and Facebook Take 20 Percent of Total Global Ad Spend,
Top List of World’s Largest Media Owners, CNBC (May 2, 2017, 8:46 AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/02/google-and-facebook-take-20-percent-of-total-globalad-spend.html; Matthew Ingram, How Google and Facebook Have Taken Over the Digital
Ad Industry, FORTUNE (Jan. 4, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/04/google-facebook-adindustry; Peter Kafka, Google and Facebook Are Booming. Is the Rest of the Digital Ad
Business Sinking?, RECODE (Nov. 2, 2016, 1:55 PM), https://www.recode.net/2016/
11/2/13497376/google-facebook-advertising-shrinking-iab-dcn.
18 See AAPL, NASDAQ (June 2, 2017), http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/aapl [https://
perma.cc/6SDZ-VQFM] ($805,538,280,000); AMZN, NASDAQ (June 2, 2017), http://
www.nasdaq.com/symbol/amzn [https://perma.cc/LGK3-33UW] ($480,972,978,949); FB,
NASDAQ (June 2, 2017), http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/fb [https://perma.cc/8L9N-S94N]
($442,928,382,963); GOOG, NASDAQ (June 2, 2017), http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/goog
[https://perma.cc/RU8L-Z6ZX] ($673,209,740,440); GOOGL, NASDAQ (June 2, 2017),
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/googl [https://perma.cc/3KGJ-58AB] ($687,504,656,146);
MSFT, NASDAQ (June 2, 2017), http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/msft [https://perma.cc/
TE7T-3XVJ] ($550,086,674,584).
19 See generally Martin Kenney, Explaining the Growth and Globalization of
Silicon Valley: The Past and Today (Jan. 12, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
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and datafication.20 Those imperatives have shaped the emergence of
smart mobile devices, wearable computing, and the Internet of things,
dictating implementations that emphasize seamless tracking, finegrained measurement of patterns of behavior and attention, extraction
of continuous flows of data, and configuration of data flows into forms
best suited to analysis and commercial exploitation.21 As a result of
these interdependent marketplace and infrastructural shifts,
commercial information collection has become a nearly continuous
condition. Communications networks have gradually been
transformed into sensing networks, organized around always-on
mobile devices that collect and transmit highly granular streams of
structured information via proprietary interfaces and protocols to
powerful, proprietary machine learning systems. Put differently,
networked media infrastructures have become pervasively
platformized.22
C. A Platform Is Not (Just) a Network
Over the past several decades, scholars in a wide variety of fields have
identified networks and infrastructures as important organizing
concepts for studying the information economy. In some discussions of
the information economy, the terms “network,” “infrastructure,” and
“platform” are used interchangeably, but platforms are not the same as
networks, nor are they simply infrastructures. Platforms represent
infrastructure-based strategies for introducing friction into networks. In
theory, the twenty-first century communications infrastructure still
known as the Internet is “open,” and for some purposes, that
characterization is accurate. For most practical purposes, however, the
“network of networks” is becoming a network of platforms; Internet
access and use are intermediated from beginning to end.
A network is a mode of organization in which hubs and nodes
structure the flows of transactions and interactions. Network
organization is not a unique property of digital information and
communications networks; rather, as network scientists have shown,
such networks simply make visible a latent characteristic of the many
20 See generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A
REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 73-97 (2013);
Jose Van Dijck, Datafication, Dataism, and Dataveillance: Big Data Between Scientific
Paradigm and Ideology, 12 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 197 (2014).
21 See generally Anne Helmond, The Platformization of the Web: Making Web Data
Platform Ready, SOC. MEDIA & SOC’Y, July-Dec. 2015, at 1.
22 See generally Jean-Christophe Plantin et al., Infrastructure Studies Meet Platform
Studies in the Age of Google and Facebook, NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y, 2016, at 1.
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human activities that rely on communication and interconnection.23
Digital information and communications networks do, however,
reduce many of the costs and lag times formerly associated with such
activities. In addition, participants in networks reap generalized
benefits (network externalities24) as those networks grow in size and
scale, and the relatively low costs of digital interconnection have
enabled digital networks to become very large.
Infrastructures are shared resources that facilitate downstream
production of other goods.25 Roads and electric power grids, for
example, play essential roles as inputs into a variety of downstream
goods, as do less tangible resources like linguistic and scientific
conventions. Notably, infrastructures may be managed as commons
but need not be: some infrastructures, such as the interbank wire
transfer system, are club goods financed and controlled by their
members; others, such as local electric power suppliers, are managed
as utilities and financed based on metered consumption charges; and
still others, including facilities for Internet access in most countries,
are privately provided but subject to various regulatory obligations.
Digital information and communications technologies function both
as infrastructures and as networks. As scholars in fields ranging from
industrial organization to geography to media and communications
studies have shown, the forms of connectivity they provide have
reshaped seemingly every area of human activity.26
Platforms exploit the affordances of network organization and
supply infrastructures that facilitate particular types of interactions,
but they also represent strategies for bounding networks and
privatizing and controlling infrastructures. They operate with the goal
of making clusters of transactions and relationships stickier — sticky
enough to adhere to the platform despite participants’ theoretical
ability to exit and look elsewhere for other intermediation options. To
accomplish that goal, platforms must provide services that participants
view as desirable and empowering, thereby generating and enabling
participants to leverage network externalities. But they also must
23

See generally ALBERT-LASZLO BARABASI, LINKED (2014).
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J.
ECON. PERSP. 93, 94 (1994).
25 See generally BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF
SHARED RESOURCES 61-114 (2012).
26 See, e.g., CASTELLS, supra note 1; GLOBAL NETWORKS, LINKED CITIES (Saskia
Sassen ed., 2002); JOSE VAN DIJCK, THE CULTURE OF CONNECTIVITY: A CRITICAL HISTORY
OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2013); Laurel Smith-Doerr & Walter W. Powell, Networks and
Economic Life, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 379 (Neil J. Smelser &
Richard Swedberg eds., 2d ed. 2005).
24
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thwart certain other kinds of networking that might facilitate defection
to rival platforms.
Platforms use technical protocols and centralized control to define
networked spaces in which users can conduct a heterogeneous array of
activities and to structure those spaces for ease of use. The vehicle for
managing the tensions between heterogeneity and ease of use is
modularity; platform protocols impose a modular structure that
enables certain types of flexibility but at the same time forecloses
others. Protocol-based control also enables intermediation and
facilitates legibility, allowing the platform to serve its own priorities.27
In Tarleton Gillespie’s formulation, the term “platform” appears to
offer users a “raised, level surface” on which to present themselves,
but at the same time it elides the necessary work of defining and
policing the platform’s edges.28 Platform protocols perform a double
function, affording access but also points of contact for exercises of
technological and political authority. The latter power is one that the
fictionalized construct of the market lacked, and it comprehensively
reshapes the conditions of economic exchange.
D. How Platforms Shape Economic Exchange
Economically speaking, platforms represent both horizontal and
vertical strategies for extracting the surplus value of user data.29
Because that goal requires large numbers of users generating large
amounts of data, the platform provider’s goal is to become and remain
the indispensable point of intermediation for parties in its target
markets. Commentators have begun to puzzle over the implications of
the dominance and staggering market capitalization of the largest
platform firms.30 The characteristic “rich-get-richer” pattern of
network organization, however, militates in favor of the emergence of

27 See Plantin et al., supra note 22, at 5-9; see also Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of
‘Platforms,’ 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 347 (2010).
28 Gillespie, supra note 27, at 358-59; see also Jonas Andersson Schwarz, Platform
Logic: An Interdisciplinary Approach to the Platform-Based Economy, POL’Y & INT. 4-13
(Aug. 3, 2017) (DOI: 10.1002/poi3.159).
29 Cf. MARK ANDREJEVIC, ISPY: SURVEILLANCE AND POWER IN THE INTERACTIVE ERA
(2007); Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an
Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 78-80 (2015). See generally NICK
SRNICEK, PLATFORM CAPITALISM (2017); DANIEL TROTTIER, SOCIAL MEDIA AS
SURVEILLANCE: RETHINKING VISIBILITY IN A CONVERGING WORLD (2012).
30 See, e.g., Alexis C. Madrigal, Silicon Valley’s Big Three vs. Detroit’s Golden-Age
Big Three, ATLANTIC (May 24, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2017/05/silicon-valley-big-three/527838.
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dominant platforms, and platform firms also have devised a variety of
other strategies for attaining and maintaining dominance, each
targeting multiple user groups.31
To begin with, platforms both enable and benefit from competitive
dynamics of economic exchange that differ in profoundly important
ways from those of traditional, one-sided markets. The exchanges
constituted by platforms are two- or multi-sided: they serve buyers,
the sellers seeking to reach them, and often advertisers seeking the
buyers’ attention. Because the platform forms relationships with
members of each group separately, it can define the terms of each
relationship differently.32 So, for example, it can charge little or
nothing to participants on one side of a target market and make its
profit on another side. A dominant platform can reduce prices to one
group — for example, book buyers or consumers of professional
networking services — below marginal cost and still maintain its
dominance by charging fees to some other group, and a provider of
free services to consumers can attain and maintain dominance by
controlling access to the “market for eyeballs.”
Another set of strategies for leveraging economies of scale into more
durable patterns of competitive advantage involves preferential
placement, and exploits a conundrum that confronts platform users as
platform economies of scale become more and more overpowering.
Platform users — whether buyers and sellers or social network
members seeking their counterparts — seek access to platforms in
order to be found. They soon discover, though, that while access to
platforms is a necessity, access alone is insufficient; competitive or
reputational success in a platform environment requires informationbased strategies for boosting visibility. In theory, the platform’s
legibility function should provide effective matching in ways that take
account of “long tail” patterns of supply and demand; in reality, the
results of algorithmic matching often seem to prioritize the most
popular results. Platforms have developed various techniques for
offering and monetizing preferential placement, such as “sponsored
search results” (e.g., Google’s AdWords and AdSense programs) and
“enhanced listing placement” (e.g., Amazon’s Featured Merchant
program).33 Because of the platform environment’s operational
31

On the rich-get-richer principle, see BARABASI, supra note 23, at 79-92.
See generally Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress
Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645 (2006); David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The
Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 18783, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w18783.
33 See, e.g., Buy Box Eligible Status, AMAZON, http://smile.amazon.com/gp/help/
32
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secrecy, however, purchasers of these services cannot easily monitor
the quality of what they have purchased; more generally, platform
users cannot easily determine whether platform firms are engaging in
other, undisclosed varieties of preferential placement.34
A third set of strategies for leveraging economies of scale into more
durable patterns of competitive advantage involves interplatform
affiliation. Smaller and more specialized platforms may contract with
more dominant platforms to provide particular services — e.g.,
payment processing, streaming video, games for social network users,
and so on. Such arrangements benefit both dominant and niche
platforms, giving niche platforms access to a larger pool of users and
dominant platforms access to a larger and deeper pool of information
about users’ online activities.35 It is unsurprising, then, that the
interrelationships among platforms have become increasingly dense
and complex. Such agreements, though, also create risks for all parties.
A dominant platform must consider the possibility that what had been
envisioned as a niche or add-on service will become a new species of
customer/display.html?nodeId=200418180 (last visited July 20, 2017); Enhanced
Listing Placement, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/
ref=hp_left_ac?ie=UTF8&nodeId=200572340 (last visited July 20, 2017); How It
Works, GOOGLE ADSENSE, https://www.google.com/adsense/start/how-it-works (last
visited July 20, 2017); How It Works, GOOGLE ADWORDS, https://adwords.google.com/
home/how-it-works (last visited July 20, 2017); see also Karla Lant, Everything You
Need to Know About Amazon Featured Merchant Status, APPEAGLE, http://blog.appeagle.
com/amazon-featured-merchant-status (last visited July 20, 2017); Chuck Topinka,
How Exactly Does Google AdWords Work?, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2014, 12:04 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2014/08/15/how-exactly-does-google-adwords-work.
See generally Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 774-83
(2017) (discussing Amazon’s services and their profitability).
34 See, e.g., Julia Angwin & Surya Mattu, Amazon Says It Puts Customers First. But
Its Pricing Algorithm Doesn’t, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 20, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.
propublica.org/article/amazon-says-it-puts-customers-first-but-its-pricing-algorithmdoesnt; Benjamin Edelman, Hard-Coding Bias in Google “Algorithmic” Search Results,
BEN EDELMAN (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.benedelman.org/hardcoding; Julia
Greenberg, Google Will Now Favor Pages That Use Its Fast-Loading Tech, WIRED (Feb.
24, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/google-will-now-favor-pagesuse-fast-loading-tech; Daniel Trielli et al., Why Google Search Results Favor Democrats,
SLATE (Dec. 7, 2015, 11:48 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_
tense/2015/12/why_google_search_results_favor_democrats.html. See generally ARIEL
EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE
ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY 35-81 (2016) (discussing collusion-based strategies
within platform environments).
35 See generally MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION
POLICY 293-99 (2016); Bertin Martens, An Economic Policy Perspective on Online
Platforms (Inst. for Prospective Tech. Studies Dig. Econ., Working Paper No. 2016/05,
2016).
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dominant intermediary in its own right, as Internet browsers, search
engines, social networks, and mobile operating systems all have done.
Niche platforms, meanwhile, are no better placed than platform users
to monitor the behavior of dominant platforms. They may find
themselves receiving fewer or different benefits than expected or
competing with the dominant platform’s own offerings under
conditions that seem to place them at a disadvantage.36
From the perspective of users, advertisers, and niche platforms,
dominant platforms like Google and Facebook function in a manner
analogous to utilities, supplying basic information services now
deemed essential to a wide variety of economic and social activities. At
the same time, dominant platforms also constitute vast and highly
differentiated information ecosystems. The tools for effecting legibility
constructed by such businesses extend globally, subsuming and
rematerializing not only markets but also patterns of social and
political interaction.
E. How Platforms Shape Information Flow, part 2: Personalization,
Polarization, and Volatility in the Networked Public Sphere
Massively intermediated, platform-based media infrastructures have
reshaped the ways that narratives about reality, value, and reputation
are crafted, circulated, and contested. Platforms enhance the ability to
form groups and share information among members, to harness the
wisdom of crowds, and to coalesce in passionate, powerful mobs, but
they also magnify the dark side of each of these forms of collective
action. The massive intermediation and datafication of networked
media infrastructures, meanwhile, shifts the tenor of much networked
interaction into the domains of the affective, instinctual, and
unreasoning.
The dominant cultural narratives about the cultural and political
effects of platforms have been celebratory. Just as networked digital
36 See, e.g., David Pierce, Pandora Premium Can’t Hang with Spotify and Apple, WIRED
(Mar. 13, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/03/pandora-premium; John
Patrick Pullen, Streaming Showdown: Apple Music vs. Spotify vs. Pandora vs. Rdio, TIME (June
9, 2015, 9:25 AM), http://time.com/3913955/apple-music-spotify-pandora-rdio-streaming;
Janko Roettgers, Pandora Adds Continuous Playback Feature to Sidestep Apple, Tidal
Exclusives, VARIETY (June 8, 2017, 10:00 AM), http://variety.com/2017/digital/news/
pandora-autoplay-exclusives-1202458470; Gerry Shih, Facebook App Makers Struggle with
How Fickle Facebook Can Be, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 11, 2013, 1:09 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/11/facebook-apps_n_2850893.html; Edward
Wyatt & Noam Cohen, Comcast and Netflix Reach Deal on Service, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23,
2014), https://nyti.ms/2mtBXtH.
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platforms have lowered the costs of identifying and connecting with
commercial counterparties, so they also have lowered the costs of
forming affinity groups of all kinds. Platform users can more easily
find and connect with others who share their hobbies and passions,
their political affiliations and goals, their racial, religious, or gender
identities, their affiliations with real-world communities (such as
neighborhood or parent-teacher associations), and many more.
Networked, platform-based digital media infrastructures also facilitate
distributed, peer-based production of information.37 As a result, the
Internet era has witnessed the emergence of a vast, diverse, and
eclectic range of cultural production, ranging from open source
software developed according to the maxim “given enough eyeballs, all
bugs are shallow” to wikis and fanworks reflecting multiple
contributions.38 The landscape of networked collective action also
encompasses new forms of collective meaning-making, such as memes
and flash mobs; new infrastructures for facilitating both traditional
charitable giving and other types of “pay-it-forward” generosity; and
new capacities for rapid organization of mass protests, such as those of
the Occupy Wall Street and Black Lives Matter movements and the
Arab Spring uprisings.39
Other implications of the contemporary, platform-based digital
environment’s affordances for group-formation, distributed peer
production, and collective action are less rosy. Crowd-based
judgments about relevance can create information cascades that lend
sensationalized, false, and hatred-inciting online material
extraordinary staying power.40 Efforts to remove hurtful material
37 See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006).
38 See ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR 30 (1999); see, e.g., AXEL
BRUNS, BLOGS, WIKIPEDIA, SECOND LIFE, AND BEYOND 101-36 (2008); FAN FICTION AND
FAN COMMUNITIES IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET (Karen Hellekson & Kristina Busse eds.,
2006); Jason Mittell, Wikis and Participatory Fandom, in THE PARTICIPATORY CULTURES
HANDBOOK 35-42 (Aaron Delwiche & Jennifer Jacobs Henderson eds., 2012).
39 See DEEN FREELON ET AL., BEYOND THE HASHTAGS: #FERGUSON, #BLACKLIVESMATTER,
AND THE ONLINE STRUGGLE FOR OFFLINE JUSTICE 5, 14 (2016); REBECCA MACKINNON,
CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 15-25
(2012); Elizabeth Day, #BlackLivesMatter: The Birth of a New Civil Rights Movement,
GUARDIAN (July 19, 2015, 5:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/19/
blacklivesmatter-birth-civil-rights-movement.
40 See April Mara Barton, Application of Cascade Theory to Online Systems: A Study of
Email and Google Cascades, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 473 (2008-2009); Timur Kuran &
Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999);
Gilad Lotan, Fake News is not the Only Problem, DATA & SOC’Y: POINTS (Nov. 22, 2016),
http://points.datasociety.net?fake-news-is-not-the-problem-f00ec8cdfcb.
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typically backfire by drawing additional attention to it, intensifying
and prolonging the unwanted exposure.41 Additionally, because of the
way that platform-based, massively-intermediated environments work,
networked spaces both expose and intensify political and ideological
polarization around multiple, assertedly equivalent truths. A wealth of
social science research shows that more homogenous groups can more
easily become polarized in both their beliefs and their perceptions of
reality.42 Such polarization is not new, but over the last several
decades, the percentages of those reporting strongly negative feelings
about those with opposing views have skyrocketed.43 Algorithmic
mediation of information flows intended to target controversial
material to receptive audiences intensifies such feelings, reinforcing
existing biases, inculcating resistance to facts that contradict preferred
narratives, and encouraging demonization and abuse.44 New data
harvesting techniques designed to detect users’ moods and emotions
and messaging techniques that rely on “clickbait” exacerbate these
problems; increasingly, today’s networked information flows are
optimized for subconscious, affective appeal.45 As in-group,
perspectival “filter bubbles” become more pronounced, crossing
cultural and ideological lines becomes more difficult. Exposure to
opposing views is more likely to trigger automatic, instinctual
rejection and anger than it is to promote reasoned engagement.46
41 See Streisand Effect, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Streisand_effect
(last updated July 6, 2017, 7:37 PM).
42 For helpful summaries, see DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE
56-72 (2014); Cass Sunstein, Believing False Rumors, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET 91,
91-106 (2010); Ana Lucía Schmidt et al., Anatomy of News Consumption on Facebook,
114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 3035, 3035-38 (2017); Walter Quattrociocchi et al., Echo
Chambers on Facebook 1-2, 4-13 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Harvard
Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 877, 2016).
43 See Matthew Gentzkow, Polarization in 2016, TOULOUSE NETWORK INFO. TECH.
(2016), https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/PolarizationIn2016.pdf.
44 See generally MARK ANDREJEVIC, INFOGLUT: HOW TOO MUCH INFORMATION IS
CHANGING THE WAY WE THINK AND KNOW 42-61 (2013).
45 See id. at 96-100, 106-10; Tasha Glenn & Scott Monteith, New Measures of Mental
State and Behavior Based on Data Collected from Sensors, Smartphones, and the Internet,
CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REP., Oct. 12, 2014, at 5-6; Franklin Foer, When Silicon Valley Took
Over Journalism, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2017/09/when-silicon-valley-took-over-journalism/534195. See generally Hilke
Plassmann et al., Consumer Neuroscience: Applications, Challenges, and Possible Solutions,
52 J. MARKETING RES. 427 (2015); Vinod Venkatraman et al., New Scanner Data for Brand
Marketers: How Neuroscience Can Help Better Understand Differences in Brand Preferences,
22 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 143 (2012).
46 See, e.g., Emma Grey Ellis, The Seth Rich Conspiracy Theory: A Tale of Two Filter
Bubbles, WIRED (May 18, 2017, 10:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2017/05/seth-rich-
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Platform-based information feeds also flatten communicative
hierarchies in a way that challenges traditional heuristics for judging
credibility and may undermine claims to objective and/or empirical
authority; within a Facebook or Twitter feed, for example, all sources
are (or appear to be) epistemologically equivalent.47
Notably, platform affordances for volatility, polarization, and
relativization are easily manipulated for malicious or simply selfinterested purposes. As is now widely known, in the months
preceding the 2016 U.S. presidential election, web sites peddling “fake
news” stories — such as allegations that Democratic candidate Hillary
Clinton and her campaign manager, John Podesta, were running a
child pornography ring out of the basement of a Washington, D.C.,
pizza restaurant — earned their distributors millions of dollars in
advertising revenues. According to their own statements, at least some
distributors had no particular political axe to grind, but instead were
simply exploiting the affordances of the network by circulating
“clickbait” carefully designed to earn the clicks, views, shares, and
retweets that generate advertising revenue. Others, we have come to
learn, were sponsored by state actors with grander hopes and
ambitions.48 As they had hoped, groups predisposed to believe the
worst of Clinton and her team shared, up-voted, and retweeted the
stories.49 Experts in election law and digital voting, watching carefully
filter-bubble; Jon Keegan, Blue Feed, Red Feed: See Liberal Facebook and Conservative
Facebook, Side by Side, WALL ST. J. (May 18, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://graphics.wsj.com/
blue-feed-red-feed; Quattrociocchi et al., supra note 42, at 12-13. The term “filter
bubble” has entered the popular lexicon as a way of conveying these effects, see
generally ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE (2011), but it may also be misleading; people
do encounter opposing views and inconvenient facts online. The bubble consists of
the priors that determine what they make of those views and facts. The filter (the
algorithm) reinforces the bubble by playing to the priors.
47 For a useful introduction to the literature on how social media users assess
credibility, with discussions of unanswered questions, see Miriam J. Metzger &
Andrew J. Flanagin, Credibility and Trust of Information in Online Environments: The
Use of Cognitive Heuristics, 59 J. PRAGMATICS 210 (2013).
48 Sam Levin, Facebook to Give Congress Thousands of Ads Bought by Russians During
Election, GUARDIAN (Sept. 21, 2017, 4:16 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2017/sep/21/facebook-adverts-congress-russia-trump-us-election; Julia Carrie
Wong, Russia’s Election Ad Campaign Shows Facebook’s Biggest Problem Is Facebook,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 21, 2017, 9:10 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/
sep/21/facebook-russia-advertising-mark-zuckerberg.
49 See Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016
Election, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 211, 223-24 (2017); David A. Graham, The ‘Comet Pizza’
Gunman Provides a Glimpse of a Frightening Future, ATLANTIC (Dec. 5, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/the-inevitability-of-more-cometpizza-incidents/509567; Lotan, supra note 40; see also Tall Tales Spread by Alex Jones
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for signs of fraudulent tampering with digital voting machines, were
unprepared for a new kind of digital tampering campaign that took
aim directly at voters’ minds. But perhaps no-one should have been
surprised; the earlier “Brexit” vote in the United Kingdom had
followed a similar pattern.50
With increased volatility and polarization also has come a rise in
identity-based harassment, mob aggression, nationalism, and
organized hate. Affordances for collective action have enabled the
rapid formation of angry, vengeful mobs, eager to shame real or
apparent transgressors or to engage in identity-based harassment and
intimidation. Women and members of racial, religious, and/or sexual
minorities who have become prominent in media and journalism or in
hacker and gaming communities are especially frequent targets of such
campaigns.51 More generally, organized hate against racial and
religious minorities is on the rise, aided by algorithmic processes that
amplify bigoted diatribes, magnify conspiracy theories, and propel
coded memes into the limelight.52 Nativist hate-mongering online has
bled inexorably into political discourse and public life, adopting
sophisticated and ironic new forms, gaining in strength as outraged
responses generate new information cascades, and fueling the rise of
the self-designated “alt-right” as a political force.53
Breed Dangerous Plots, SOUTHERN POVERTY L. CTR.: INTELLIGENCE REP. (Feb. 15, 2017),
http://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/tall-tales-spread-alexjones-breed-dangeorus-plots.
50 See Carole Cadwalladr, The Great British Brexit Robbery: How Our Democracy Was
Hijacked, GUARDIAN (May 7, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2017/may/07/the-great-british-brexit-robbery-hijacked-democracy; Katherine
Viner, How Technology Disrupted the Truth, GUARDIAN (July 12, 2016, 1:00 AM),
http://theguardian.com/media/2016/jul/12/how-technology-disrupted-the-truth.
51 See generally CITRON, supra note 42; WHITNEY PHILLIPS, THIS IS WHY WE CAN’T
HAVE NICE THINGS (2015).
52 See, e.g., ALICE MARWICK & REBECCA LEWIS, MEDIA MANIPULATION AND
DISINFORMATION ONLINE (2017); Emma Grey Ellis, The Internet Protocols of the Elders
of Zion, WIRED (Mar. 12, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2017/03/internetprotocols-elders-zion; Mark Potok, The Year in Hate and Extremism, SOUTHERN
POVERTY L. CTR: INTELLIGENCE REP. (Feb. 15, 2017), http://splcenter.org/fightinghate/intelligence-report/2017/year-hate-and-extremism.
53 See George Hawley, The Alt-Right Is Not Who You Think They Are, AM.
CONSERVATIVE (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/thealt-right-is-not-who-you-think-it-is; Ben Schreckinger, The Alt-Right Comes to
Washington, POLITICO (Jan./Feb. 2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/
01/alt-right-trump-washington-dc-power-milo-214629; Jason Wilson, Hiding in Plain
Sight: How the Alt-Right Is Weaponizing Irony to Spread Fascism, GUARDIAN (May 23,
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/23/alt-right-online-humoras-a-weapon-facism.
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The increasingly polarized, volatile, and unreasoning character of
interaction in online, platform-based digital environments complicates
accounts of the democratizing potential of information networks.
Networked, platform-based information and communication
technologies are crowd-enhancers; they boost the amplitude of
collective actions and counter-actions, making networked spaces sites of
both extraordinary generativity and extraordinary volatility.
Undeniably, such technologies have important affordances for bottomup organizing, collective creativity, and crowd-sourced, democratic
action. Collective meaning-making and collective action, however, can
be directed toward a variety of ends. The particular configurations that
those technologies have assumed within the political economy of
informational capitalism also make them sites of extraordinary
manipulability, creating new risks to the human project of democratic,
inclusive, sustainable coexistence. Accounts of the promise or peril of
networked communication and production have tended to downplay
one or the other face of networked communication and collective
action, but — at least for the present — the two are inextricably linked.
II.

PLATFORM ENTITLEMENTS

As platforms have interacted with the legal system, their efforts have
begun to reshape the landscape of baseline entitlements (and
disentitlements) in informational resources. A useful starting point
from which to begin thinking through the issues is the classic
taxonomy developed by Wesley Hohfeld over a century ago.54
Hohfeld’s central insight was that entitlements are relational, and that
the rights-duties relationship — i.e., the relationship that arises when
one person has a right that others must respect — is only one of the
possibilities. Entitlements also may take the form of privileges,
powers, or immunities, each of which affects others in different kinds
of ways. If one takes that insight seriously, it follows that law might
shape the transition to an information economy in multiple ways. It
might define rights and correlative duties in new informational
resources, but it might also, for example, recognize privileges to
appropriate certain new and valuable resources and/or confer legal
immunity for certain types of informational harm. As we are about to
54 See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913); cf. Pierre Schlag, How to Do
Things with Hohfeld, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (2015) (arguing that Hohfeldian
analysis is best understood as a method of deconstructing legal relations to identify
the imprint of power).
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see, it has done all of those things — and has done them in ways that
systematically facilitate the platform economy’s emergence.
A. Points of Access (Rights to Control Entry)
Among intellectual property lawyers, it is a truism that data and
algorithms — the building blocks of innovation and competition —
cannot themselves be the subjects of property rights. Appearances can
be deceptive, however. The movement to an informational economy is
reconstructing data and algorithms as appropriable inputs to new and
highly informationalized modes of profit extraction. Data flows from
the dematerialization of labor, land, and money have been joined by a
new and highly lucrative fourth factor of production: personal
information gathered from and about individuals and groups. Property
formalism notwithstanding, these resources are the subjects of active
appropriation strategies. As the perceived imperatives of access to data
and to data processing capacity have sharpened, platform-driven
cycles of dis- and re- intermediation have emerged as a recurring motif
in information-economy narratives about competition, innovation,
and access.
Platform-based competitive strategies revolve fundamentally around
control of access in two different and complementary senses. Platform
users seek access to the essential social, commercial, and cultural
connectivity that platforms provide, while platform providers seek
access to the data necessary to create and sustain competitive
advantage in their chosen field(s) of intermediation. The result is a
bargain that appears relatively straightforward — access for data —
but that in reality is complex and importantly generative. One
important byproduct of these access-for-data arrangements is a quiet
revolution in the legal status of data as (de facto if not de jure)
proprietary informational property.
A principal worry for any platform is disintermediation by a wouldbe competitor, and so platform providers work to define both
collected data and algorithmic logics as zones of exclusivity. In
particular, platforms use contracts systematically to facilitate and
protect their own legibility function, extracting transparency from
users but shielding basic operational knowledge from third-party
vendors, users, and advertisers alike. The particular form of the accessfor-data contract — a boilerplate terms-of-use agreement not open to
negotiation — asserts a nonnegotiable authority over the conditions of
access that operates in the background of even the most generative
information-economy service. Boilerplate agreements are contractual
in form but mandatory in operation, and so are a powerful tool both
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for private ordering of behavior and for private reordering of even the
most bedrock legal rights and obligations.55
From an intellectual property perspective, the terms-of-use
agreements crafted by platforms and other information intermediaries
function as points of entry for institutional entrepreneurship targeting
the form and substance of legal entitlements in information. In a
process that is fundamentally performative, the terms-of-use
agreement steps in where the map of formal legal entitlements ends,
providing a vehicle for leveraging trade secrecy entitlements into de
facto property arrangements that affect large numbers of people with
no direct relationship with the platform owner. The contracts
themselves, of course, are “only words” — and, for that matter, words
that most users do not read — but they gain powerful normative force
from both their continual assertion and reassertion and their
propagation within environments that use technical protocols to
define the parameters of permitted behavior.56 The combination of
asserted contractual control and technical control becomes the vehicle
through which the platform imposes its own logics on the encounters
that it mediates.
The logic of performative enclosure that infuses terms-of-use
agreements also carries over into platform enterprises’ dealings with
developers and commercial counterparties, where it is paired with
subsidiary strategies of performative openness. Even as they jockey
with one another to become the intermediary of choice for more and
more users’ networked interactions, dominant platforms understand
the risk of disintermediation as a continuing threat. Successful
platforms jealously guard access to both data collected from users and
the algorithms used to process the data — and at the time same entice
developers and commercial counterparties with promises of access. So,
for example, Facebook’s promise not to share users’ data with
advertisers is true; it offers advertisers placement precisely targeted to
the inferred needs and desires of its billions of users but never direct
access to the data or algorithms themselves. Application developers
receive access to carefully curated data sets, data structures and

55 See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING
RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013).
56 Cf. Nicholas Blomley, Disentangling Law: The Practice of Bracketing, ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI., Nov. 2014, at 133 (describing the ways that legal practices and
distinctions themselves produce the perceived reality within which those distinctions
matter); Nicholas Blomley, Performing Property: Making the World, 26 CAN. J.L. &
JURIS. 23, 39-40 (2013).
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programming interfaces.57 Google’s vaunted commitments to open
data and open code do not extend to its algorithms or to the data it
collects about its users, and it imposes other restrictive conditions on
developers seeking to offer Android devices or Android-compatible
applications.58
Traditional intellectual property rights play helpful but only
secondary roles in the process of de facto propertization, functioning
as sources of leverage that can be invoked to channel would-be users
toward entering the access-for-data bargain on the platform’s terms
and/or to prevent would-be competitors from gaining access to
information stored on the platform by other means. For example,
access to a branded exchange may enable third-party vendors to
position their products and services as more desirable to consumers.
When access to a platform requires technical interoperability — as is
the case, for example, with apps for desktop and mobile operating
systems — patents and copyrights can supply important points of
leverage against unauthorized access by third-party vendors and
would-be platform competitors. As the example of Google shows,
however, not all platform businesses consider copyrights a necessary
tool for limiting access.
In sum, the access-for-data arrangement is both a concrete bargain
and a complex act of institutional entrepreneurship, with a number of
interrelated implications for the intellectual property system that are
still playing out. In addition to their other roles, platforms are in an
important sense intellectual property entrepreneurs, working to refine
and propagate appropriation strategies that serve their economic
interests. Yet the investigation in this section also has surfaced
additional questions: Where do the data that feed platformized logics
of appropriation come from, and who decides on their allocation?
What accounts for the startling power of platforms to command
adherence to their terms? Have any countervailing obligations
emerged that platforms are bound to respect? Who or what determines
the proper allocation of accountability for harms flowing from
datafication and platformization? As we will see in the remainder of
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See generally Helmond, supra note 21; Plantin et al., supra note 22, at 11-12.
See generally Benjamin Edelman, Does Google Leverage Market Power through
Tying and Bundling?, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 365, 389-91 (2015); Plantin et al.,
supra note 22, at 13-14; Christian Sandvig, Seeing the Sort: The Aesthetic and Industrial
Defense of “The Algorithm,” MEDIA-N (2014), http://median.newmediacaucus.org/artinfrastructures-information/seeing-the-sort-the-aesthetic-and-industrial-defense-ofthe-algorithm.
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this Part, answering those questions requires moving beyond
investigations of rights and correlative duties to respect them.
B. Points of Extraction (Privileges to Appropriate)
As Part I explained, the data extracted from individuals plays an
increasingly important role as raw material in the political economy of
informational capitalism. Scholarship on the relationship between law
and the collection and processing of personal information typically
considers such activities as raising problems of privacy or data
protection, and typically has focused on regulation of such activities
after the fact. But the legal framework within which the collection,
processing, and use of personal data occur is not simply a reactive
framework, nor is it simply concerned with the relationship between
policing (or employment, consumer finance, or medical research) and
privacy. Understood as processes of resource extraction, the activities
of collecting and processing personal information mobilize a very
different legal construct — one foreign to privacy and data protection
law but commonplace within intellectual property law. Contemporary
practices of personal information processing constitute a new type of
public domain: a source of raw materials that are there for the taking
and that are framed as inputs to particular types of productive
activity.59
A public domain is not a naturally occurring phenomenon. It is first
and foremost an idea: a culturally-situated way of understanding
patterns of resource ownership and availability. But a public domain
also is much more than an idea: the construct of a public domain both
designates particular types of resources as available and suggests
particular ways of putting them to work.60 In Hohfeldian terms, a
public domain is a zone of legal privilege: it demarcates conduct as to
which no-one has a right to object. It thereby legitimates the resulting
patterns of appropriation and obscures the distributive politics in
which they are embedded.
We have already seen that the logic of productive appropriation
from a public domain of personal data has catalyzed sweeping
reorganizations of sociotechnical activity to facilitate cultivation,
59 The discussion in this section is adapted from Julie E. Cohen, The Biopolitical
Public Domain: The Legal Construction of the Surveillance Economy, PHIL. & TECH., Mar.
28, 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13347-017-0258-2.
60 See generally Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public
Domain, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1331 (2004); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY
L.J. 965 (1990).
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harvesting, and appropriation of personal data. Notably,
participants in the personal data economy — including platform
providers but also data brokers and digital analytics firms — have
systematically devised data collection strategies that route around
the obstacles posed by privacy and data protection frameworks
devised for an earlier era. In the United States, most privacy
statutes are sector-specific; many apply only to certain entities and
most contain exceptions allowing consent to information
collection and processing. Platforms in particular have structured
their information-collection activities around broad presumptive
consent and have configured the world of networked digital
infrastructures and artifacts in ways that make user enrollment
seamless and near-automatic. The resulting sociotechnical processes
work both to generate large quantities of personal information and to
make public domain status the default condition for the information
that is generated.
The logic of productive appropriation from a public domain of
personal data also does epistemological work. It frames the personal
information harvested within networked information environments as
raw, creating the backdrop for new algorithmic techniques of
knowledge production that operate as sites of legal privilege. Within
intellectual property circles, that narrative is entirely commonplace. In
1984, John Moore sued the Regents of the University of California and
a UCLA doctor who had treated his leukemia for conversion
(wrongful appropriation) of his personal property. The property
identified in his complaint was his cancerous spleen, which had been
removed from his body and used to develop a valuable, patented cell
line. The lawsuit reached the California Supreme Court, which
rejected Moore’s conversion theory on the ground that diseased tissue
removed from the human body could not be the subject of a property
interest (though it allowed Moore to maintain an action for failure of
informed consent).61 The Moore opinion is routinely included in firstyear property casebooks, where it stands for the principle that anticommodification values can (sometimes) prevent the propertization of
human tissue. But the court did not hold that human tissue could not
be the subject of any proprietary claims. Rather, it contrasted Moore’s
claim to that of the research scientists who had labored to develop the
patentable byproduct. And, even as it took for granted the wisdom of
granting patents on medical research byproducts, it worried fretfully
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Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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about the costs to innovation of allowing proprietary claims to the raw
materials used in medical research.62
One can trace a similar elaboration of relative privilege and
disentitlement in the evolving debate about the future of fair
information practices in the era of pervasive commercial surveillance.
In regulatory proceedings and in the media, the data processing
industries have advanced a carefully crafted narrative that links data
processing with “innovation” and positions privacy and “innovation”
as fundamentally and intractably opposed. That narrative powerfully
shapes prevailing perceptions of feasible regulatory options.63 Data
brokers and platform firms proudly tout their “unprecedented,”
“proprietary,” and sometimes “patented” analytic techniques.64 Claims
like these situate ownership of personal data at the heart of the data
refinery, vesting it in those who (supposedly) create value where none
previously existed. They work to create and perpetuate a narrative of
romantic authorship that unfolds in counterpoint to that of the public
domain, and that is old and familiar.65 Meanwhile, commentators
concerned to preserve the benefits of so-called “Big Data” worry that a
right to withdraw one’s data from databases, if widely exercised, would
compromise the utility of those databases as resources for pattern
identification.66
The “raw data” framing, of course, conceals an important
misdescription. As we saw in Part I, it is inaccurate to say that the data
62

See id. at 494-95.
See Julie E. Cohen, The Surveillance-Innovation Complex: The Irony of the
Participatory Turn, in THE PARTICIPATORY CONDITION IN THE DIGITAL AGE 207, 218-22
(2016).
64 For some examples, see About, INTELIUS, http://corp.intelius.com (last visited July
20, 2017) (“proprietary genomic technology”); About, SPOKEO, http://www.spokeo.com/
about (last visited July 20, 2017) (“proprietary merge technology”); Company Overview,
ID ANALYTICS, http://www.idanalytics.com/company (last visited July 20, 2017)
(“patented analytics”); Amit Finkelstein, Facebook Analytics Adds Pages Support and
Launches Automated Insights, FACEBOOK FOR DEVELOPERS (Apr. 18, 2017),
https://developers.facebook.com/blog/post/2017/04/18/facebook-analytics-new-featuresf8 (“advanced machine learning and artificial intelligence,” “exciting features,”
“powerful”); New Oracle Data Cloud and Data-as-Service Offerings Redefine Data-Driven
Enterprise, ORACLE (July 22, 2014), http://www.oracle.com/us/corporate/pressrelease/
data-cloud-and-daas-072214 (“unprecedented intelligence”); Susan Wojcicki, The Eight
Pillars of Innovation, THINK WITH GOOGLE (July 2011), https://www.thinkwithgoogle.com/
marketing-resources/8-pillars-of-innovation (“sophisticated technology,” “innovative
outcomes,” “uncharted territory”).
65 See generally JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1998); Chander & Sunder, supra note 60.
66 See, e.g., Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big Data: A Time
for Big Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 67-68 (2012).
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collected for processing just happen to be there; flows of personal data
are artifacts of design for datafication. From that perspective, the
processes of harvesting and culling “raw” consumer personal data
resemble the harvesting of raw materials within an industrial system of
agriculture. Just as agriculture on an industrial scale demands grain
varieties suited to being grown and harvested industrially, so the
collection of personal information on an industrial scale inevitably
adopts an active, curatorial stance regarding the items to be gathered.67
Strains of information are selected and cultivated precisely for their
durability and commercial value within a set of information processing
operations. The data are both raw and cultivated, both real and highly
artificial. The algorithmic processes that manipulate the data function
as information-age refineries. In a process comparable to the milling of
corn and wheat to generate stable, uniform byproducts optimized for
industrial food production, they convert data-based inputs into the
forms best suited for exploitation on an industrial scale.68 They refine
and massage consumer personal data to produce virtual
representations — data doubles — that work to make human
behaviors and preferences calculable, predictable, and profitable in
aggregate by producing tranches of data doubles with probabilistically
determined purchasing and risk profiles.69 Business of all sorts can use
the information to determine the particular prices and feature
packages best calibrated for surplus extraction, and to generate
preemptive nudges that, when well executed, operate as self-fulfilling
prophecies, producing consummated transactions over the offerings
already judged to be most likely to appeal to targeted consumers.70

67 See MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE’S DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR
MEALS 30-31, 36-37, 41-42, 45, 58-59 (2007). See generally Danah Boyd & Kate
Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a Cultural, Technological,
and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 662 (2012); LISA GITELMAN, ED.,
“RAW DATA” IS AN OXYMORON (2013).
68 See POLLAN, supra note 67, at 17-19, 85-99.
69 See generally Greg Elmer, IPO 2.0: The Panopticon Goes Public, 4 MEDIA TROPES
1, 9-12 (2013); Marion Fourcade & Kieran Healy, Seeing Like a Market, 15 SOCIOECON. REV. 9 (2017); Zuboff, supra note 29.
70 This terminology combines the concept of the nudge, imported from the
context of behavioral economics, see generally RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN,
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008), and is
now widely used by both critics and admirers of data-based analytics, with that of
preemption as used by MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE END(S) OF
LAW 57-61 (2015), and Ian Kerr & Jessica Earle, Prediction, Preemption, Presumption:
How Big Data Threatens Big Picture Privacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 68-71 (2013).
The preemptive nudge simultaneously suggests and forecloses.
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The idea of a public domain of personal information does vital
background work in the emerging platform economy, altering the
legal status of the inputs to and outputs of personal data processing in
ways that are relational and distributive. It both suggests and
legitimates a pattern of appropriation by some, with economic and
political consequences for others.
C. Speech Markets and Information Laboratories (Immunities from
Accountability)
As the networked information environment has redistributed
control over reputational development, powerful economic actors
have worked to craft narratives that make unaccountability for certain
types of information harms seem logical, inevitable, and right. They
have relied heavily on the U.S. first amendment tradition, which
characterizes the public sphere as a marketplace of ideas — an arena
for neutral truth production through deliberate, reasoned exchange,
where the goods on offer can be evaluated on their merits, where the
volume and quality of information are regulated by the laws of supply
and demand, and where those making decisions about the quality of
information function as separate, individual nodes of rationality.71 In
that project, they have benefited from preexisting libertarian and
neoliberal narratives that already supplied potent recipes for resisting
media regulation. As the marketplace metaphor has come to be seen as
increasingly inapt for the massively-intermediated, platform-based
information environment, however, platforms also have introduced a
new metaphoric frame: that of the information laboratory, which
functions as a site of depoliticized innovation through continuous,
behaviorist experimentation. In Hohfeldian terms, the developments
sketched in this section are most aptly characterized as emergent legal
immunities and correlative disabilities. Their ongoing construction has
proceeded in almost willful disregard of the fact that the affordances of
71 The metaphor traces its origins to a famous dissent by Justice Holmes. See
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market . . . .”). For a sampling of perspectives on the metaphor and its significance for
free speech jurisprudence, see generally Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of
Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing
Myth, 33 DUKE L.J. 1 (1984); Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353 (2000).
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the platform-based, massively intermediated information environment
strain the idea of neutral truth production past the breaking point.
The legal construction of platform immunity for information harms
is in part a constitutional strategy that leverages preexisting trends in
first amendment jurisprudence. For some time now, a campaign has
been underway to insulate all forms of commercial information
processing and direct-to-consumer communication from regulatory
oversight on first amendment grounds. For almost two centuries, the
first amendment was considered largely irrelevant to regulation of
speech advancing commercial activities because such regulation was
understood to be directed fundamentally at commerce rather than at
public discourse. That began to change in the late twentieth-century,
in a line of cases that became known as the Court’s commercial speech
jurisprudence; according to those cases, regulation of commercial
speech that is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity must
advance a substantial government interest and must be appropriately
tailored to that interest.72 Today that doctrine is under sustained
assault for being too lenient. Both regulations addressing direct-toconsumer communication and regulations addressing information
processing more generally begin with some definition of scope that
identifies particular types of content and/or particular actors. Other
strands of first amendment jurisprudence label such distinctions as
requiring compelling justification and the narrowest possible tailoring.
That analytical gap has created a point of entry for an antiregulatory
agenda that holds all regulation of information processing to be
illegitimate.73 A notable recent victory for that agenda is Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., in which a majority of the Court struck down a Vermont
statute prohibiting pharmaceutical companies’ use of prescriberidentifying information for marketing purposes, applying strict
72 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 56166 (1980). See generally Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
73 For a discussion of the origins of the neoliberal first amendment as an advocacy
movement, see generally Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WISC. L. REV. 133.
For influential formulations of the first amendment challenge to information privacy
regulation, see generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy:
The Troubling Implications of a Right to Keep Other People from Speaking About You, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000); Solveig Singleton, Privacy as Censorship: A Skeptical View of
Proposals to Regulate Privacy in the Private Sector, CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS, Jan. 22,
1998, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-295.pdf (Policy Analysis
No. 295); Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka, What Unites Advocates of Speech Controls &
Privacy Regulation?, PROGRESS ON POINT, Nov. 2009, at 1, http://www.pff.org/issuespubs/pops/2009/pop16.19-unites-speech-and-privacy-reg-advocates.pdf.
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scrutiny because the restriction was both content- and speakerbased.74 Characterizing the state’s action as an attempt to undermine
the persuasive force of pharmaceutical marketers’ speech (and thereby
harnessing the marketplace metaphor), the majority concluded that
the law struck at the core of the zone that the first amendment
protects.75
Although platforms did not originate the campaign to
constitutionalize regulation of commercial information processing
activities, they have been willing participants both through their own
efforts and via the efforts of trade associations and libertarian think
tanks. Advertiser trade associations that count major platform firms
Apple, Google, and Microsoft among their members filed a coalition
amicus brief on behalf of respondent data brokers in Sorrell and
regularly participate in other commercial speech litigation.76 In 2012,
Google commissioned an expert white paper on platform free speech
rights that has become a cornerstone of the speech-based defense that
platforms assert in litigation with private plaintiffs challenging their
information processing practices.77
In litigation with private parties alleging information-related harms,
however, courts typically do not need to reach constitutional defenses
because another kind of immunity kicks in. Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), enacted as part of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, grants broad immunity to online
intermediaries for their roles in distributing speech produced by
others.78 In the legislative history and in individual statements,
74 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 563-70 (2011). See generally Reed
v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (holding that laws either motivated by
disagreement with a message or unable to be justified without reference to the content
of the regulated speech are content-based and must satisfy strict scrutiny).
75 See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 577-78.
76 Brief of Amici Curiae Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. et al. in Support of
Respondents, Sorrell, 564 U.S. 552 (No. 10-779), 2011 WL 1253920. But see, e.g.,
Brief of Amici Curiae of Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. et al. in Support of Petitioners,
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (No. 02-575), 2003 WL 835112.
77 See Eugene Volokh & Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for
Search Engine Results, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 883 (2012); see also e-ventures Worldwide,
LLC v. Google, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1274 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (“The Court has
little quarrel with the cases cited by Google for the proposition that search engine
output results are protected by the First Amendment.”) (citing Zhang v. Baidu.com
Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)), appeal docketed, No. 17-11178 (11th
Cir. Mar. 16, 2017); Defendants Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC; Backpage.com,
LLC; and New Times Media, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 9, 17-26, J.S. v.
Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, No. 12-2-11362-4 (Wash. Sup. Ct. Mar. 23, 2017).
78 Communications Decency Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 138
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members of Congress endorsed the marketplace metaphor as the
principal justification for section 230’s broad grant of immunity,
stating their belief that such immunity would foster and preserve the
emerging network as a vibrant marketplace of ideas.79 Both the
statutory language and the discourse that surrounded its adoption
framed still-emergent networked information architectures as engines
for neutral truth production — conduits that would simply reflect and
transmit what people wanted to say. In other words, they posited the
Internet as a space lacking the sorts of specific affordances that might
themselves shape communicative practices and communicative
content.80
Speech intermediaries and information aggregators have worked
strenuously to defend that institutional settlement even as time and
technological change have undermined its implicit premises,
downplaying or reframing the extent to which what we see online is
itself recursively shaped by what information businesses produce. For
the most part, courts have uncritically accepted those arguments,
concluding both that algorithmic mediation doesn’t make an
intermediary a publisher of other people’s speech and that the same
processes of mediation are speech-like in their own right.81
As Part I explained, however, market-based narratives about the
origins of and justifications for platform immunity are premised on
(1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012)).
79 See Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 133
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (1998)) (“The Internet and other
interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse,
unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual
activity.”); 142 CONG. REC. H1175 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Gilchrest) (“And with the advent of the information age, we need to recognize the
need for competition among information media so that the free marketplace of ideas
can be communicated through a free marketplace of information outlets. This bill
seeks to exploit the market’s ability to maximize quality, maximize consumer choice,
and minimize prices.”); see also Senator Ronald Wyden, Speech to the Section 230
Anniversary Conference (Mar. 4, 2011) (“The Internet is becoming a central platform
for commerce and a means by which people and societies organize. It is the shipping
lane of the 21st century, the marketplace of ideas and a democratic town square inside
even the most repressive of nations. It was imperative in 1996 that the nascent
Internet be protected from the interests of those that wanted to tax and control it. But
now that we have seen the power and importance of the Internet — protecting it is
that much more imperative.”).
80 See Gillespie, supra note 27, at 359. On the persistence and inaccuracy of the
myth of cyberspace as empty space, see generally Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace and/as
Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210 (2007) [hereinafter Cohen, Cyberspace].
81 See generally James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868
(2014).
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assumptions about the affordances of media infrastructures that no
longer hold. Platform-based, massively-intermediated processes of
search and social networking are inherently processes of market
manipulation. Networked environments configured to optimize data
harvesting and surplus extraction operate — and are systematically
designed to operate — in ways that preclude even the most perceptive
and reasonable consumer from evaluating the goods or services on
offer. Predictive profiling seeks to minimize the need to persuade by
targeting directly those potential customers most strongly predisposed
to buy and appealing to everything that is known about those
customers’ habits and predilections. And, as we saw in Part I, the
deliberate design of platform-based, massively-intermediated media
infrastructures for data harvesting and commercial surveillance has
produced other, less deliberate affordances that amplify the role of
unreason in online interaction, and that matter enormously.
Most recently, platform businesses have begun to acknowledge more
directly their pervasive manipulations of the information environment
in the service of profit extraction, and to recast those manipulations as
inherently directed toward discovering scientific truths about human
behavior. Platform-based media infrastructures, they argue, are
information laboratories, in which providers of information services
experiment to see which types of information are most useful and
most responsive to consumers’ needs and innovate by providing that
information. So, for example, Google’s chief economist has explained
that at any given time Google and competing search engines are
running millions of experiments on their users, designed to determine
how we respond to information so that search results can be
optimized.82 Facebook, which through its news feed competes with
search engines to structure users’ access to the wider information
environment, also experiments on its users. In 2014, a paper
coauthored by a Facebook data scientist and published in the
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences described a massive
experiment in which Facebook varied items in users’ newsfeeds and
then used automated discourse analysis tools on those users’ own
subsequent posts to gauge the effects of the newsfeeds on their
emotional states.83 When critics decried Facebook’s failure to give

82

See generally Hal R. Varian, Beyond Big Data, 49 BUS. ECON. 27 (2014).
See Adam D. I. Kramer, Jamie E. Guillory & Jeffrey T. Hancock, Experimental
Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional Contagion Through Social Networks, 111 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 8788 (2014).
83
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users prior notice of the experiment, Facebook’s defenders pointed out
that marketing is inherently a science of experimentation.84
Within the emerging narrative of the information laboratory as an
engine of behaviorist truth-discovery and depoliticized innovation, the
fact that online information intermediaries manipulate meaning in ways
and for purposes that they do not disclose ceases to be an inconvenient
truth to be carefully downplayed and becomes banal and unremarkable
reality. From that perspective, the recent troubling demonstrations that
platform-based, massively-intermediated media infrastructures have
played pivotal roles in fostering deeply entrenched political polarization
— polarization that extends all the way down to bedrock narratives
about reality and scientific fact — are mere glitches in systems that are
still being perfected through sober and responsible experimentation. So
framed, they are not problems requiring resolution in the domain of
media regulation, competition regulation, or some other domain, but
rather matters best left to the benevolent and disinterested experts in
the white lab coats to sort out.85
That too is a mistake on the most basic, descriptive level.
Affordances for polarization and volatility are not fixed and invariant;
they are constructed and can be amplified or dampened by deliberate
choices made in the course of a platform’s design. At minimum, the
platform business model, which is so heavily reliant on predictive
profiling and target marketing and on the information cascades and
sensationalism that draw eyeballs and generate ad revenues, is causally
implicated in the current dysfunctions of the online information
environment even though that was not its creators’ intent. Arguably,
platform businesses that resist serious, open exploration of those
causal dynamics are complicit in fostering the dysfunctions. More
84 For critiques, see, for example, Michael Hiltzik, Facebook’s User Manipulation Study:
Why You Should Be Very Afraid, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 2014, 2:02 PM), http://
www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-facebooks-user-20140630-column.html; Letter
from James Grimmelmann & Leslie Meltzer Henry, Professors of Law, Francis King Carey
Sch. of Law, to Inder M. Verma, Editor-in-Chief, Proceedings of the Nat’l Acad. of Sci. (July
17, 2014), http://james.grimmelmann.net/files/legal/facebook/PNAS.pdf. For defenses, see,
for example, Dan Diamond, The Outrage over Facebook’s ‘Creepy’ Experiment Is out-ofBounds — and This Study Proves It, FORBES (July 1, 2014, 2:34 PM), http://www.
forbes.com/sites/dandiamond/2014/07/01/the-outrage-over-facebooks-creepy-experimentis-out-of-bounds-and-this-study-proves-it; Duncan J. Watts, Stop Complaining About the
Facebook Study. It’s a Golden Age for Research, GUARDIAN (July 7, 2014, 7:45 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/07/facebook-study-scienceexperiment-research.
85 For an especially fulsome statement of this view, see Mark Zuckerberg, Building
Global Community, FACEBOOK (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/notes/markzuckerberg/building-global-community/10154544292806634.
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troubling still, some platforms have been silent partners in fostering
the hate and harassment that they officially disclaim.86 If ever the time
were ripe for rethinking the frames and presumptions that
conventionally have structured discussions of media regulation in U.S.
law and policy, that time surely is now.
The logic of expressive immunity, however, requires that attempts to
focus judicial and legislative attention on these issues be met with
carefully tended hysteria about censorship and injured protestations of
first amendment virtue. Those strategies too build upon traditions
within first amendment doctrine and rhetoric. Both the arguments for
first amendment immunity and the strident defenses of intermediary
immunity by information businesses and their apologists express a
long-established and distinctively neoliberal ideology of public
discourse, within which profit-motivated private enterprises are
appropriate and morally virtuous guarantors of expressive liberty.87
From one perspective, they represent the latest step in a decades-long
campaign to equate all forms of media regulation with censorship;
from another, they have produced a new and powerful antiregulatory
force field that insulates information businesses from accountability
for both new and old information harms. An analytical framework that
begins by assuming the problem of mediated unreason away disables
courts and policymakers from crafting appropriate (and appropriately
speech-regarding) forms of regulatory oversight.

86 See, e.g., Madison Malone Kircher, Are Tech Companies Lazy, Incompetent, or
Greedy?, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 15, 2017, 5:40 PM), http://nymag.com/selectall/2017/09/
google-facebook-and-twitter-sell-hate-speech-targeted-ads.html; Keegan Hankes, Cloudflare
Optimizing Content Delivery for at Least 48 Hate Sites Across Europe, SOUTHERN POVERTY L.
CTR. (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/03/07/cloudflareoptimizing-content-delivery-least-48-hate-sites-across-europe; Ken Schwencke, How One
Major Internet Company Helps Serve up Hate on the Internet, PROPUBLICA (May 4, 2017, 8:00
AM), http://propublica.org/article/how-cloudflare-helps-serve-up-hate-on-the-web?utm_
campaign=weekly-newsletter&utm_source=pardot&utm_medium=email. As of this
writing, increased attention to this issue is beginning to prompt changes in platform
policies, but the changes are controversial and contested. See Timothy B. Lee, Tech
Companies Declare War on Hate Speech—And Conservatives Are Worried, ARS TECHNICA
(Aug. 31, 2017, 7:05 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/08/tech-companiesare-cracking-down-on-hate-speech/.
87 See generally Julie E. Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1119 (2015) [hereinafter Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment]; Timothy K.
Kuhner, Citizens United as Neoliberal Jurisprudence: The Resurgence of Economic
Theory, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 395 (2011).
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D. Conduits vs. Content (Powers of Interdiction)
Platforms are not the only powerful entities with interests in
shaping flows of information, and logics of intermediation are not the
only kinds of logics that networked, platform-based infrastructures
enable. Networked media infrastructures also offer new possibilities
for interrupting and blocking information flows, and those capabilities
can be deployed to serve a variety of interests. In particular, nation
states and intellectual property owners have pushed both to code
interdiction capabilities into the network’s underlying logical and
hardware layers and to impose interdiction obligations on network
intermediaries, including platforms. In Hohfeldian terms, such
arrangements are most aptly classified as powers to alter the legal
obligations of others and to impose liability for noncompliance.
Platforms, meanwhile, have resisted those efforts, seeking
arrangements that better serve their own interests. In terms of law on
the books, those struggles have produced a still-shifting patchwork of
regulatory obligations and political stalemates. The apparent disarray,
however, masks two more durable shifts. In many contexts, platformbased and algorithmically-mediated “self-regulation” has emerged as
the path of least resistance. At the same time, logics of fiat interdiction
have become progressively normalized within legal and policy
discourse.
State actors have always sought to control information flows, and all
states permit some such controls. For example, in democratic
countries that traditionally have recognized broad protection for
freedoms of speech and association, there is broad consensus that
neither child pornography nor step-by-step instructions for producing
weapons-grade plutonium should circulate freely. In mid-1990s,
however, amid dawning realization that decentralized digital networks
facilitated the uncontrolled and sometimes viral spread of all kinds of
information, long-stable areas of consensus about state control of
information flows began to destabilize and shift. Some countries began
to mandate backbone-level filtering for certain kinds of content and/or
to enlist Internet access and search providers in such filtering.88
Others began to confront new kinds of disputes about prohibited
information flow.
In the United States, one recurring topic of dispute has been the
extent of the government’s ability to conduct secret surveillance
88 See generally MACKINNON, supra note 39, at 34-66; A. Michael Froomkin, The
Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE 129 (Brian Kahin
& Charles Nesson eds., 1997).
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programs that rely on the cooperation of private communications
providers and use practices of “deep secrecy” to shield such programs
from public oversight.89 By the turn of the twenty-first century, a
diverse collection of scholars, tech industry observers, and legal
advocates had become worried that networked digital communications
infrastructures were enabling vast, secret expansions in government
surveillance activities. Bits of evidence gleaned from public
investigations following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, inadvertent leaks,
and isolated acts of whistleblowing were beginning to add up to the
outline of something much larger. The courts, however, rebuffed an
early attempt to litigate the chilling effects of dragnet surveillance,
reasoning that the plaintiffs had not alleged cognizable injury because
they could not prove they or their clients had been targeted or that any
of their communications had been collected and read.90 After
disclosure of a long-term, secret, government surveillance operation
inside AT&T’s San Francisco Bay Area operations center prompted
class action litigation, Congress hastily amended the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act to retroactively authorize certain
warrantless demands for interception and also granted retroactive
immunity to intermediaries that had complied with such demands.91
Then, in June 2013, the world learned that former National Security
Agency contractor Edward Snowden had copied and disclosed to the
media voluminous files documenting the NSA’s extralegal surveillance
of communications worldwide, including many programs conducted
with the essential involvement of platform firms. In the wave of
lawsuits that followed the Snowden disclosures, courts have become
willing to concede that the government conducted some level of
dragnet communications surveillance but then have cited other
justifications either for dismissal or for allowing only limited
“jurisdictional discovery” that feature logics of fiat interdiction at their
core, including both the need to defer to the executive branch in
national security matters and the imperative of protecting state
secrets.92
89

See generally David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2010).
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1140-41 (2013).
91 See FISA Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436, 2448-67
(2008) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a, 1885a(a)(4) (2015)); In re Nat’l
Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 949 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(dismissing class action claims), aff’d in relevant part, 671 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2011),
cert. denied, 568 U.S. 958 (2012).
92 See, e.g., Wikimedia Found. v. NSA, 857 F.3d 193, 209-11, 213-15 (4th Cir.
2017) (recognizing standing for large media organization engaged in trillions of
communications but holding that other plaintiffs lacked standing because they could
90
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Another recurring topic of dispute has been the extent to which the
government can require platforms to preserve lines of access into
users’ private communications. In 1994, Congress enacted legislation
requiring telecommunications providers to design and maintain
wiretap capability, but efforts to legislate similar “back door”
capabilities for digital microprocessors were defeated after strong
opposition from both the computer industry and academic computer
scientists.93 The resulting equilibrium was only temporary, however.
The statutory framework has become increasingly obsolete in an era in
which communications by voice, text, and email all travel over digital
networks and in which capabilities for strong communications
encryption are increasingly widespread. In the wake of the 2015
terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California, after which investigators
acquired but could not readily access one terrorist’s iPhone, law
enforcement and national security officials mounted an aggressive
campaign, still continuing as of this writing, to convince both
Congress and the courts to impose decryption mandates on
communications firms that provide strong encryption capabilities to
their users.94
not show that NSA’s upstream surveillance program intercepted “substantially all”
communications); Schuchardt v. President, 839 F.3d 336, 349-54 (3d Cir. 2016)
(accepted allegation that NSA’s upstream surveillance program intercepted
substantially all communications for purposes of ruling on motion to dismiss but
cautioning that plaintiff should be allowed only limited “jurisdictional discovery”
because of secrecy concerns surrounding national security operations); Obama v.
Klayman, 800 F.3d 559, 563-64 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Brown, J., concurring) (same);
ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 751-56 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (dismissed
constitutional claims but noting that, even if those claims could proceed, preliminary
injunction would be inappropriate given the urgently compelling nature of the
government’s need to combat terrorism), rev’d on other grounds, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir.
2015); Jewel v. NSA, No. C 08-04373 JSW, 2015 WL 545925, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
10, 2015) (granting summary judgment for government on plaintiffs’ constitutional
claims because, even if plaintiffs could establish standing, state secrets doctrine would
prevent full litigation of the issues), appeal dismissed, 810 F.3d 622, 625 (9th Cir.
2015) (holding that certification for interlocutory appeal was not warranted).
93 See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. 103-414,
108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2012));
DANIELLE KEHL ET AL., DOOMED TO REPEAT HISTORY? LESSONS FROM THE CRYPTO WARS
OF THE 1990S 1, 5-11 (2015), http://static.newamerica.org/attachments/3407doomed-to-repeat-history-lessons-from-the-crypto-wars-of-the-1990s/Crypto%20Wars_
ReDo.7cb491837ac541709797bdf868d37f52.pdf; Steven Levy, Battle of the Clipper
Chip, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June 12, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/12/
magazine/battle-of-the-clipper-chip.html?pagewanted=all.
94 See In re Order Requiring Apple, Inc. to Assist in the Execution of a Search
Warrant Issued by this Court, 149 F. Supp. 3d 341, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); In re The
Search of an Apple Iphone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a
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The major copyright industries and software producing firms also
have worked to alter the legal status of providers of networked
information services in ways that would require them to prevent flows
of unauthorized content or face potentially ruinous liability. The
political power of the copyright industries predates that of platform
firms. Over the course of the twentieth century, the publishing, music,
television, and motion picture industries coalesced into a politically
savvy interest group that exerted powerful influence over the shape of
copyright legislation. By the 1990s, the software industry also had
emerged as a force to be reckoned with in copyright legislative
debates. As the uncontrolled viral spread of information via digital
networks began to command the attention of lawmakers and
policymakers, both old and new copyright industries worked to spread
alarm about the growing amount of online infringement and filesharing. In a blizzard of press releases and media interviews, and in a
variety of more formal interventions ranging from conference remarks
to congressional testimony, they equated online copyright
infringement with theft, piracy, communism, plague, pandemic, and,
notably, with terrorism.95 They lobbied strenuously for the enactment
of new legislative protections and also filed high-profile lawsuits
against third-party service and equipment providers that they viewed
as culpable facilitators.
Generally speaking, the copyright industries have pursued two
primary strategies that implicate the legal status of platform firms. One
revolves around takedowns of infringing content using a streamlined
process triggered by notice without prior judicial review; formally, the
process is optional, but platforms that implement it receive safe harbor
from infringement liability.96 Although the notice-and-takedown
system regularly elicits significant numbers of meritless or legally
Black Lexus IS300, No. ED 15-0451M, 2016 WL 618401, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16,
2016); The Encryption Tightrope: Balancing Americans’ Security and Privacy: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 14-15 (2016) (statement of James
Comey, Director, FBI); Stephanie K. Pell, You Can’t Always Get What You Want: How
Will Law Enforcement Get What it Needs in a Post-CALEA, Cybersecurity-Centric
Encryption Era?, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 599, 621-26 (2016); All Writs Act Orders for
Assistance from Tech Companies, AM. C.L. UNION, http://www.aclu.org/map/all-writsact-orders-assistance-tech-companies (last visited July 20, 2017).
95 See generally Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95
GEO. L.J. 1, 24-25 (2006); John Logie, A Copyright Cold War? The Polarized Rhetoric of
the Peer-to-Peer Debates, FIRST MONDAY (July 7, 2003), http://firstmonday.org/article/
view/1064/984.
96 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202, 112 Stat.
2860, 2879-80, 2885 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)-(d), (j)(1)
(2012)).
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questionable takedown notices (many generated by automated
processes for detecting infringement), it has been implemented around
the world as a result of pressure exerted by U.S. trade negotiators.97
The second strategy relies on prohibitions against circumvention of
technical access protections and trafficking in circumvention
technologies.98 The anti-trafficking provisions in particular were the
cornerstone of a litigation campaign designed to ensure that
manufacturers of equipment for rendering media content sought
appropriate licenses. As a result of those efforts and parallel campaigns
to develop new technical-protection formats and standards, the major
commercially available systems for delivering and playing audiovisual
content now incorporate functionality designed to defeat copying and
prevent retransmissions to unauthorized platforms and devices.99
The emergence of dominant platform firms, however, has shifted the
balances of power in debates about both government surveillance and
online copyright enforcement. Platform and copyright interests have
clashed repeatedly both in the courts and in Congress, and platform
interests often have gotten the upper hand. From the beginning, new
platform-based technologies for storing, finding, and sharing
information seemed to frustrate efforts to block unauthorized flows of
infringing content. In litigation, the copyright industries argued that
the platform business model fell outside the scope of legislated safe
harbors for online service providers that complied with the notice and
takedown process; in Congress, they pressed their case for the
imposition of affirmative filtering obligations and other new
mandates.100 Both efforts failed repeatedly. The push for new mandates
97 See Markham C. Erickson & Sarah K. Leggin, Exporting Internet Law Through
International Trade Agreements: Recalibrating U.S. Trade Policy in the Digital Age, 24
CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 317, 343-49 (2016). See generally Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech
Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the DMCA on the First
Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171 (2010); Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter,
Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621 (2006).
98 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act §§ 1201-1204.
99 See generally JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE,
AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 158-60, 179-81 (2012); TARLETON GILLESPIE,
WIRED SHUT: COPYRIGHT AND THE SHAPE OF DIGITAL CULTURE (2007).
100 See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006,
1021-23 (9th Cir. 2013); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 34-35 (2d
Cir. 2012); Audio Broadcast Flag Licensing Act of 2006, H.R. 4861, 109th Cong.
(2006); Digital Transition Content Security Act of 2005, H.R. 4569, 109th Cong.
(2005); Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act of 2002, S. 2048,
107th Cong. (2002); see also Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691-92 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (invalidating a broadcast content protection rule issued by the FCC on
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culminated in 2011, when proposed legislation establishing new
procedures for blocking access to domains offering infringing content
and isolating them from their payment providers began to move
rapidly through Congress and was widely expected to pass. Instead,
platform firms flexed their newfound political muscle in a novel way,
repurposing their access protocols to coordinate a massive
mobilization of the online community that effectively shut down many
of the Internet’s most popular sites.101 Congress tabled the legislation
soon afterward and has not revived it.
Platform firms also have visibly resisted some government initiatives
for surveillance and deep secrecy. In 2008, after several widelypublicized capitulations by platform firms to authoritarian regimes’
demands for censorship of certain content, a coalition of platform
firms, academics, and nongovernmental organizations formed the
Global Network Initiative, an organization dedicated to helping
communications intermediaries advocate for their users’ freedom of
speech, privacy, and other civil liberties worldwide.102 After the
Snowden revelations, platform giant Apple Computer spearheaded a
movement to make strong encryption the marketplace default for both
voice and text communications.103 As law enforcement officials
seeking access to encrypted communications and devices have urged
Congress to respond by imposing decryption mandates, platform firms
jurisdictional grounds). But see Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices and
Compatibility Between Cable Systems and Consumer Electronics Equipment, 68 Fed.
Reg. 66,728 (Nov. 28, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 15, 76) (incorporating
copy-protection requirement into cable plug-and-play standard).
101 See, e.g., Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011);
Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual
Property Act (PIPA), S. 968, 112th Cong. (as amended, May 26, 2011); SOPA/PIPA:
Internet Blacklist Legislation, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/coicainternet-censorship-and-copyright-bill (last visited Mar. 20, 2015).
102 GLOB. NETWORK INITIATIVE, GNI PRINCIPLES ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND
PRIVACY 1-2 (2008), http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/GNI-Principleson-Freedom-of-Expression-and-Privacy_0.pdf; see MACKINNON, supra note 39, at 13839, 179-82; Jeffrey Rosen, Google’s Gatekeepers, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 28, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/magazine/30google-t.html; Jane Spencer & Kevin J.
Delaney, YouTube Unplugged, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 21, 2008, 11:59 PM), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/SB120605651500353307.
103 Kevin Poulsen, Apple’s iPhone Encryption Is a Godsend, Even if Cops Hate It,
WIRED (Oct. 8, 2014, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2014/10/golden-key; see
Joseph Cox, Encryption Is Going Mainstream, but Will People Actually Use It?, VICE:
MOTHERBOARD (Aug. 21, 2014, 8:05 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/
8qx5zp/encryption-is-going-mainstream-but-will-people-use-it; David Meyer, Why
WhatsApp’s Encryption Embrace Is a Landmark Event, FORTUNE (Apr. 5, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/04/06/whatsapp-encryption-embrace.
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have pushed back, arguing that mandatory decryption “back doors”
will make the network less secure for everyone.104 Platforms also have
fought for the ability to make public certain basic kinds of information
about the many requests that they receive to provide communications
data for national security investigations.105
At the same time, though, platforms also have engaged in increasing
amounts of filtering and interdiction, both for their own purposes and
as a strategy for defusing public controversy and forestalling direct
regulation. Every major Internet company that hosts user-provided
content uses automated filtering technology to prevent the posting of
infringing content, and the major payment providers have begun
entering agreements with the major copyright trade associations that
obligate them to restrict access by entities and sites identified as
infringing.106 Similarly, following its successful campaign against
legislated domain-blocking requirements, Google announced that it
would begin demoting or removing entirely from search results sites
that generate repeated takedown notices.107 Dominant platform firms
also filter and remove a wide variety of other content, including some
terrorist-related content, and are always-already poised to expand
those initiatives as external events seem to require.108 Notably,
104 See generally Harold Abelson et al., Keys Under Doormats: Mandating Insecurity
by Requiring Government Access to All Data and Communications, 1 J. CYBERSECURITY 69
(2015); Bruce Schneier, Opinion, How to Design — and Defend Against — the Perfect
Security Backdoor, WIRED (Oct. 16, 2013, 9:25 AM), http://www.wired.com/2013/10/
how-to-design-and-defend-against-the-perfect-backdoor; Sara Sorcher, The Battle
Between Washington and Silicon Valley Over Encryption, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR:
PASSCODE (July 7, 2015), http://projects.csmonitor.com/cryptowars.
105 See generally Hannah Bloch-Webha, Process without Procedure: National Security
Letters and First Amendment Rights, 49 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 367, 376-81 (2016); Rebecca
Wexler, Warrant Canaries and Disclosure by Design: The Real Threat to National
Security Letter Gag Orders, 124 YALE L.J.F. 158 (2014).
106 See generally Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private
Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L. REV. 81 (2010); Annemarie Bridy,
Internet Payment Blockades, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1523 (2015).
107 See An Update to Our Search Algorithms, GOOGLE: INSIDE SEARCH (Aug. 10, 2012),
https://search.googleblog.com/2012/08/an-update-to-our-search-algorithms.html; see also
Continued Progress on Fighting Piracy, GOOGLE: PUB. POL’Y BLOG (Oct. 17, 2014),
https://publicpolicy.googleblog.com/2014/10/continued-progress-on-fighting-piracy.html;
Adi Robertson, Google Rolling Out New Search Update to Downrank ‘Most Notorious’ Pirate
Sites, VERGE (Oct. 17, 2014, 11:55 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/10/17/6994249/
google-rolling-out-pirate-search-update-report; James Titcomb, Google and Microsoft
Agree Crackdown on Illegal Downloads, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 20, 2017, 7:29 AM),
http://telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/02/20/google-microsoft-agree-anti-piracy-codecrackdown-illegal-downloads.
108 See, e.g., Timothy B. Lee, Facebook Revamps Political-Ad Rules After Discovering
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although the major platforms widely publicize information about the
takedown notices they receive from copyright owners and, to the
extent permitted, about government production requests, they provide
no comparable public transparency about the details of their own
automatic filtering and manipulation.
Commentators attempting to evaluate the complex landscape of
platform behavior have disagreed about whether to count platforms as
civil libertarians, obstructors of justice, or privatized extensions of the
surveillance state.109 I will return to the puzzle of how to connect
platform behavior with platform motivation in Part III.D, below; here,
my point is more basic and concerns the division of authority to
intercept and block information flows. Although the balance of power
remains contested and is still evolving, two points seem certain: First,
failures on the part of copyright interests and law enforcement to
achieve their goals via legislation or litigation most often simply shift
struggles over interdiction and control into less visible channels.
Second, compromises that involve voluntary filtering shift much dayto-day authority over interdiction of information flows to platforms
and at the same time make interdiction decisions more difficult to
contest. The “new normal” in the platform economy is a condition in
which privatized, fiat-based prohibitions on information flow are both
increasingly routine and increasingly opaque.
III. PLATFORMS AND REGULATORY INSTITUTIONS
Many lawyers are familiar with recent high-profile debates over the
applicability of existing regulatory obligations to platform companies

Russian Ad Buys, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 21, 2017, 1:38 PM), https://arstechnica.com/
tech-policy/2017/09/facebook-revamps-political-ad-rules-after-discovering-russian-ad-buys;
Sam Levin, Tech Giants Team Up to Fight Extremism Following Cries that They Allow
Terrorism, GUARDIAN (June 26, 2017, 3:24 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2017/jun/26/google-facebook-counter-terrorism-online-extremism; How Facebook Guides
Moderators on Terrorist Content, GUARDIAN (May 24, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://www.
theguardian.com/news/gallery/2017/may/24/how-facebook-guides-moderators-on-terroristcontent. See generally Tarleton Gillespie, Governance of and by Platforms, in SAGE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL MEDIA (Jean Burgess et al. eds., forthcoming 2017).
109 See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech and Compelled Conformity, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (privatized extensions); Kate Klonick, The
New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2017) (civil libertarians); Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance
Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (obstructors). See generally ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND., WHO HAS YOUR BACK? PROTECTING YOUR DATA FROM GOVERNMENT
REQUEST: SHARING ECONOMY EDITION 3-4 (2016), https://www.eff.org/files/2016/05/04/
who-has-your-back-2016.pdf.
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— for example, whether Uber is a taxi company, whether and how
Amazon.com transactions should be taxed, whether Google or
Facebook should be required to remove privacy-invasive or harassing
material that is brought to its attention, and so on. Orly Lobel’s
important work on the regulation of platforms has parsed many of the
complexities of these disputes, arguing that the answers to questions
about both classification and institutional competence depend
importantly on context.110
Those debates are important, but participants in them tend to take
preexisting institutional features of the legal system for granted, and
my project here is different. Platform companies are encountering
legal systems worldwide at a time of crisis. Court systems are
overburdened, regulatory bureaucracies seem to be forever racing to
respond to fast-moving technological and business developments, and
new institutions for resolving trade disputes and setting network
standards route nimbly around other features of the legal landscape —
ranging from conflicting national laws to international human rights
mandates and goals — as though they were mere speed bumps.
Platform companies did not create any of these situations, but they
have proved adept at exploiting them. Their interventions matter
precisely because the contours of our regulatory institutions —
including not only agencies but also courts and institutional structures
for recognizing and vindicating fundamental rights — are not timeless
and unchanging.
Powerful economic interests have always sought to reshape
jurisdictional, procedural, and methodological rules to their
advantage. Legal scholars who study judicial and regulatory processes
have shown that institutional design responds over time to the
interventions of powerful actors who, in Marc Galanter’s framing, are
repeat players and can play for rules in addition to results.111 Wellresourced repeat players also work to craft compelling narratives about
the structure of legal institutions, pursuing a species of “deep” capture
that operates at the level of ideology.112 Both projects become easier
when the ground is shifting. In their encounters with judicial and
110

See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 117-66 (2016).
See generally PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND
HOW TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014); Marc Galanter, Why
the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 95 (1974).
112 See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the
Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA.
L. REV. 129 (2003).
111
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regulatory institutions in the United States and around the world,
platform firms and their advocates have labored to minimize their
accountability and maximize their scope for self-determination and
self-governance. Their interventions have both accelerated and altered
the trajectories of institutional evolution.
Processes of institutional realignment also respond to preexisting
settlements regarding the distribution of rights, privileges, and other
entitlements. As Morton Horwitz demonstrated in his classic study of
the evolution of private and commercial law prior to the constitutional
battles of the Lochner era, such distributive baselines produce deep
structuring effects, shaping the framing of disputes about a variety of
other matters.113 So too with informational entitlements and
disentitlements. In contests over the legal obligations of platforms, the
logics of performative enclosure, appropriative privilege, expressive
immunity, and fiat interdiction generate powerful normative force
fields, defining some options as the paths of least resistance and
foreclosing others entirely.
A. Catch Me If You Can: Platforms in Court
Platforms have developed a suite of powerful strategies for evading
accountability in litigation.114 To some extent, they have benefited
from processes of retrenchment that were already underway. Never an
ideal vehicle for advancement of mass justice claims, the court system
today is overtaxed logistically and under siege ideologically. As
consumer products and services and related theories of personal and
economic harm have become more complex, numbers of lawsuits and
litigants have mushroomed. At the same time, a well-funded
movement for “tort reform” has contested attempts to shift liability for
complex, highly informationalized harms to the industries whose
products and activities are implicated in those harms.115 Against a
backdrop of growing institutional dysfunction, platforms have
leveraged the logics of performative enclosure, appropriative privilege,
113 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
47-54, 78-97, 116-26, 186-210, 218-26 (1977).
114 The discussion in this section is adapted from Julie E. Cohen, Information
Privacy Litigation as Bellwether for Institutional Change, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 535 (2017)
[hereinafter Cohen, Information Privacy Litigation].
115 For some different perspectives on what to do about the resulting dysfunctions,
see generally GILLIAN K. HADFIELD, RULES FOR A FLAT WORLD: WHY HUMANS INVENTED
LAW AND HOW TO REINVENT IT FOR A COMPLEX GLOBAL ECONOMY (2016); Richard A.
Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899 (1996); Judith
Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 421-22 (1982).
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and expressive immunity to keep many disputes out of the court
system entirely, to ensure that others are soon dismissed, and to
minimize the operational impact of the few that proceed to judgment.
Many lawsuits against platform firms allege information privacy
harms. Such lawsuits are part of a more general trend in the
contemporary litigation landscape. New class complaints alleging
information privacy and data security violations are filed seemingly
every few weeks and have become enormously controversial. Large
information businesses and defense counsel bemoan the purported
threats to corporate bottom lines and to processes of informationbased “innovation” more generally.116
At least in the case of lawsuits against platform firms, however,
those worries are largely unfounded. A constellation of rules covering
everything from waiver of judicial process to standing to the proper
approaches to structuring class claims and remedies works
systematically to blunt their impact. Those results flow partly from
more general changes in the class action litigation landscape. Like
contemporary mass tort claims, most information privacy claims
against large information businesses are funneled into procedurally
opaque multidistrict litigation proceedings, and most suits settle while
still in the preliminary stages, so that even a certification decision is
made in the context of a motion to certify a settlement class.117
Platforms, however, have begun to seem uniquely untouchable.
116 See, e.g., Brief of the Coal. for Sensible Pub. Records Access et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1-2, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016)
(No. 13-1339) (“As a result [of the decision below], amici’s members — some of
whom supply lending, insurance or transactional information, or facilitate residential
real estate purchases — face increased costs of doing business and are significantly
less willing to bear risk and to innovate, to the ultimate detriment of all consumers
and the economy.”); Brief for Amici Curiae Ebay Inc. et al. in Support of Petitioner at
23-24, Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (No. 13-1339) (“Perversely, the primary consequences
of the expensive litigation and resulting in terrorem settlements of these no-injury
controversies are the diversion of resources away from technology companies’ efforts
to develop and provide increasingly innovative services and products to the users who
often comprise the putative classes in these cases.”); Brief of Trans Union LLC as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (No. 13-1339)
(“If this Court does not grant the petition for certiorari and correct the Ninth Circuit’s
error, then the immediate result will be more ‘bet the company’ litigation filed under
the [Fair Credit Reporting] Act,” inevitably reducing innovation in new data services
and diminishing “the scope of predictive information available to credit grantors to
manage risk”); see also Larry Downes, A Rational Response to the Privacy “Crisis,” CATO
INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS, Jan. 7, 2013, at 1-2, 16, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/
pubs/pdf/pa716.pdf.
117 See, e.g., In re LinkedIn User Privacy Litig., 309 F.R.D. 573, 584 (N.D. Cal.
2015); In re Google Referrer Header Privacy Litig., No. 5:10-cv-04809 EJD, 2014 WL
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To begin with, platform firms enjoy an especially privileged position
from which to exploit the relational turn in litigation avoidance. In a
wide variety of contexts ranging from employment contracts to service
contracts to one-off consumer transactions, courts have become more
and more willing to require enforcement of boilerplate clauses
requiring arbitration of disputes and waiver of the right to bring class
claims — and, as a result of that stance, the use of such clauses is
becoming increasingly widespread.118 Platform firms have taken full
advantage of this trend, incorporating litigation avoidance provisions
into their terms of service and thus — via the logic of performative
enclosure — into the core of the access-for-data bargain.119 As
platforms intermediate users’ networked lives more and more
completely, such provisions have become both unavoidable and farreaching.
A second avenue for disposing of information privacy litigation
against platform firms involves standing to sue. Plaintiffs asserting
intangible harms often have difficulty establishing the requisite
injury.120 The logic of appropriative privilege gives platforms a leg up
1266091, at *2-4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014); In re Netflix Privacy Litig., No. 5:11-CV00379 EJD, 2012 WL 2598819, at *2-4 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2012). See generally
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71
(2015); J. Maria Glover, Mass Litigation Governance in the Post-Class Action Era: The
Problems and Promise of Non-Removable State Actions in Multi-District Litigation, 5 J.
TORT L. 1 (2014).
118 See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 469-71 (2015); Am.
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013); Nitro-Lift Techs.,
L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 20-21 (2012); Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v.
Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 532-34 (2012); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95,
102 (2012); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011); see also
Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U.
ILL. L. REV. 371, 400-09 (2016); Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How
American Employers Are Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal
Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1310 n.9, 1344-45 (2015). See generally J. Maria
Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052
(2015).
119 See Amy J. Schmitz, Consumer Redress in the United States, in THE NEW
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR CONSUMER DISPUTE RESOLUTION 325, 327-30, 336-38
(Pablo Cortés ed., 2016); Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining
“Consumer-Friendly” Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 850-61 (2012); The Gig Economy: Using Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements with Class Action Waivers, FISHER PHILLIPS (May 1, 2017),
https://www.fisherphillips.com/pp/publication-the-gig-economy-using-mandatoryarbitration-agreements.pdf; see also Stephanie Strom, When ‘Liking’ a Brand Online
Voids the Right to Sue, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014), https://nyti.ms/1l9uZ5R (discussing
corporations’ attempts to require mandatory arbitration through platforms).
120 See generally Cohen, Information Privacy Litigation, supra note 114; Seth F.
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in disputes about injuries allegedly flowing from their collection and
use of personal information. Within the Hohfeldian framework, the
correlative of an entitlement that takes the form of a privilege is no
right to object to the conduct that the privilege protects. Defendants in
information privacy litigation understand that relationship well and
have labored tirelessly to convince courts of its inevitability, framing
acts of information collection and use as routine background
conditions that create no cognizable injury.121 Information privacy
claims, they argue, are really no more than generalized claims about
the perceived unfairness of economic and technological processes that
people have not yet learned to accept. The argument reliably gets
results; many information privacy claims are dismissed quickly on
standing grounds and the Supreme Court has signaled its implicit
support for that approach.122
Other lawsuits against platform firms allege harms suffered as a
result of information initially furnished by third parties but made
more salient through the involvement of platform-based
intermediation. In these suits, platforms benefit from the logic of
expressive immunity described in Part II.C above. In contexts
involving alleged defamation and similar harms, courts have

Kreimer, “Spooky Action at a Distance”: Intangible Injury in Fact in the Information Age,
18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745 (2016).
121 See, e.g., Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(“[A] single, random cardholder’s name has little or no intrinsic value to defendants
(or a merchant). Rather, an individual name has value only when it is associated with
one of defendants’ lists. Defendants create value by categorizing and aggregating these
names.”); Brief for Experian Info. Sols., Inc., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 1-2, First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 567 U.S. 756 (2012) (No. 10-708) (“Such
suits are possible because the [Fair Credit Reporting] Act permits plaintiffs to sue
for . . . what may be a wholly technical violation. Indeed, it is not uncommon in these
cases for significant numbers of class members to have actually benefited from the
alleged violations.”); Brief of Trans Union LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 19, Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 13-1339) (“It is rare
for a single item, inaccurate in a small detail, to actually result in a denial of credit.”);
James C. Cooper, Opinion: Why the Supreme Court Should Side with Data Brokers,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/
Passcode-Voices/2015/1102/Opinion-Why-the-Supreme-Court-should-side-with-databrokers.
122 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (ruling in the context of a class action for
statutory damages for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act that even when
Congress has defined a cause of action and provided a remedy, an individual plaintiff
still must show adverse consequences that are sufficiently concrete); see also Michael
Wolgin, “Concrete” Disparities in Article III Case Law After Spokeo, CLASS ACTIONS &
DERIVATIVE SUITS, Winter 2017, at 4 (providing overview of post-Spokeo split among
lower courts on what must be shown to establish concreteness).
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interpreted the statutory immunity for online intermediaries broadly,
eliminating not only traditional publisher liability but also distributor
liability for intermediaries possessing knowledge of ongoing harm.123
In addition, because the statutory language sweeps well beyond
defamation in ways that implicate many other types of expressive
conduct, it has supplied defenses in many — though not all —
lawsuits alleging a wide variety of other harms ranging from
discrimination to market manipulation.124 Although some
commentators have questioned whether Congress really intended to
grant such broad insulation to a business model whose shape was still
unknown, others have criticized the current regime because it does
not yield dismissals quickly enough.125
Of the handful of lawsuits that survive these initial obstacles —
often claims for violation of sector-specific privacy statutes that
prescribe particular procedures and provide statutory damages for
noncompliance — many confront additional hurdles flowing from the
opaque, technically arcane character of platform-based intermediation
and from the logic of performative enclosure, which operates to
shelter the technical details from discovery. Interactions involving
123 See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-34 (4th Cir. 1997)
(barring a defamation claim against AOL.com for its delay in removing defamatory
posts about the plaintiff on an AOL bulletin board); Murawski v. Pataki, 514 F. Supp.
2d 577, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (barring a libel claim against Ask.com for displaying a
website with allegedly defamatory statements about plaintiff in its search results);
Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500-01 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (barring a
defamation claim against Google for archiving websites containing defamatory
statements about the plaintiff in its cache). For comparison with the traditional
formulation of defamation liability, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM.
LAW INST. 1977) (imposing liability on anyone who negligently or intentionally
publishes defamatory information about another); id. § 577 (defining publication
broadly as intentional or negligent communication of defamatory material to any third
party, and imposing liability on those who “intentionally and unreasonably” fail to
remove defamatory statements from their land or chattels); id. § 578 (holding republishers liable to the same degree as the original publisher); id. § 581 (imposing
liability on a distributor of a defamatory statement only if the distributor “knows or
has reason to know of its defamatory character,” but treating television and radio
broadcasters as though they were original publishers).
124 For reviews of the case law, see generally David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or
Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity under Section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373 (2010) (finding that roughly
one-third of litigated cases survived the assertion of CDA 230 defenses); Jeff Kosseff,
The Gradual Erosion of the Law that Shaped the Internet: Section 230’s Evolution over
Two Decades, 18 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2016) (describing a suite of emerging,
judicially-developed limitations on the scope of CDA 230 immunity).
125 See, e.g., Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Vanished, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH.
137, 141-43 (2013).
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consumers’ personally identifying information often are embedded
deeply within the operating protocols of a mobile phone platforms or
web browser, and may involve complex commercial relationships
among multiple players in platforms’ cross-licensing ecologies. That
complexity and opacity enable platform firms to argue that the
methods proposed for ascertaining classes of affected consumers are
too imprecise.126 Courts reject some of these ascertainability
challenges, but they also routinely decline requests to certify classes
consisting of all consumers affected by the challenged activity.127 They
also have been reluctant to craft discovery orders broad enough to
enable plaintiffs’ counsel to understand the challenged patterns of
information flow.128
Even the rare lawsuits against platform firms that yield seven-figure
class payouts have relatively little effect on platform information
processing practices. Consider two examples: In 2010, Facebook
agreed to pay $9.5 million to settle class claims resulting from its
Beacon service, which had automatically repurposed user posts
intended only for limited circulation as advertising for the products
and services that users happened to mention; in 2011, Google paid
$8.5 million to settle claims arising from the rollout of its Google Buzz
social networking service, which used users’ Gmail contacts to
populate their publicly visible profiles.129 Both awards received
126 In most circuits, a putative class plaintiff must prove that a proposed class is
both sufficiently numerous to warrant class-based adjudication and sufficiently
definite that its membership is ascertainable. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)-(3); Marcus
v. BMW of North Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592-93 (3d Cir. 2012). But see Mullins v.
Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657-58 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Nothing in Rule 23
mentions or implies this heightened requirement under Rule 23(b)(3), which has the
effect of skewing the balance that district courts must strike when deciding whether to
certify classes.”)
127 See, e.g., Opperman v. Path, Inc., No. 13-cv-00453-JST, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
92403, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2016) (declining to certify class of all users of the
invasive versions of Path’s software and instead limiting class to those registered as
users during four-month period in which the software downloaded iDevice Contacts
from all users); In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., No. 15-MD-02617-LHK, 2016
WL 3029783, at *26 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016) (limiting class to those consumers who
had already paid for credit monitoring or stated that they had expended personal time
on credit monitoring); In re Hulu Privacy Litig., No. C 11–03764 LB, 2014 WL
2758598, at *14 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2014) (denying without prejudice motion to
certify class of “users of both Facebook and Hulu during the class period” and
suggesting possible methods of defining subclasses based on variables such as whether
users remained logged in and whether and how they cleared cookies).
128 See Campbell v. Facebook Inc., No. 13-CV-05996-PJH, 2016 WL 7888026, at
*1-2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2016).
129 See Damon Darlin, Google Settles Suit over Buzz and Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3,
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widespread media coverage and seemed large in absolute terms, but
they were minimal relative to the number of individuals affected and
more minimal still when measured against the profits resulting from
the challenged activity.130 Both awards, moreover, accompanied
agreements in which the platform firms promised to do more to
educate consumers about their practices and to redesign their
procedures for obtaining consent, but not to halt the challenged
practices entirely. Settlements such as these are widely regarded as
having produced almost no meaningful change in business practices
relating to the collection, processing, and exchange of consumer
personal information. Suits against information platforms under other
kinds of statutes — for example, class actions by Uber passengers
alleging deceptive safety-related marketing and by Uber drivers
alleging that they are employees entitled to reimbursement for fuel
and maintenance expenses — have begun to follow similar patterns.131
Copyright infringement lawsuits are a partial exception to these
stories of displacement, deflection, and minimization of claims of
platform-related injury. Platforms have won many of the reported
cases, but those victories have not come quickly or easily. Instead,
litigation over such matters as the adequacy of takedown procedures,
the triggers for indirect infringement liability, and the interplay
between indirect infringement theories and the statutory safe harbors
has required courts to explore and evaluate platform operations in
detail.132 In light of the discussion in Part II.D, above, that should
2010, 12:19 AM), https://nyti.ms/2sOTSNJ; Miguel Helft, Critics Say Google Invades
Privacy with New Service, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2010), https://nyti.ms/2k8g2Gg; David
Kravets, Judge Approves $9.5 Million Facebook ‘Beacon’ Award, WIRED (Mar. 17, 2010,
2:18 PM), https://www.wired.com/2010/03/facebook-beacon-2; Ryan Singel, Facebook
Beacon Tracking Program Draws Privacy Lawsuit, WIRED (Aug. 14, 2008, 1:48 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2008/08/facebook-beacon.
130 For discussion of this point and detailed analysis of several recent settlements, see
generally Marc Rotenberg & David Jacobs, Enforcing Privacy Rights: Class Action
Litigation and the Challenge of Cy Pres, in ENFORCING PRIVACY (David Wright & Paul De
Hert eds., 2015). To similar effect, remedial orders resolving class claims for injunctive
or declaratory relief tend to be very narrowly drawn. See, e.g., In re Yahoo Mail Litig.,
308 F.R.D. 577, 601 (N.D. Cal. 2015); David Kravets, The Most Absurd Internet Privacy
Class-Action Settlement Ever, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 30, 2016, 11:55 AM),
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/08/the-most-absurd-internet-privacy-classaction-settlement-ever.
131 See Sam Levin, Uber Lawsuits Timeline: Company Ordered to Pay Out $161.9m Since
2009, GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2016/apr/13/uber-lawsuits-619-million-ride-hailing-app; Uber Lawsuit Settlement,
CLASSACTION.COM, https://www.classaction.com/uber/settlement/#uber-settlements (last
visited June 7, 2017).
132 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
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come as no particular surprise; the balance of power between platform
firms and the major copyright industries is still evolving. Even here,
however, the trajectory has begun to bend away from the courts.
Copyright litigation between the major industry players can be
prolonged and expensive — litigation between Viacom and Google
over infringing videos on YouTube dragged on for seven years — and
both sides face considerable downside risk.133 And so it also should
come as no particular surprise that major litigation between platforms
and copyright interests has become much rarer and compromises
based on platform self-regulation more common.
B. Now You See Me, Now You Don’t: Platforms and the Administrative
State
Platforms have developed equally powerful strategies for avoiding
regulatory accountability. Like the courts, the administrative state —
still comprised principally of models and constructs developed in the
context of the industrial economy — is poorly equipped to address the
challenges now confronting it.134 Platforms have proved adept both at
practicing regulatory arbitrage and at resisting or coopting attempts to
extend new kinds of regulatory oversight to their core information
processing operations. As before, they have leveraged the logics of
performative enclosure, productive appropriation, and expressive
immunity and the distributive baselines suggested by those logics to
ensure that their operations have remained largely invisible to
regulatory oversight.
Some of the most visible and heated disputes about platforms and
the administrative state are the least complicated. For example,
regimes regulating labor and transportation employ definitional
gateways — e.g., “employer” and “employee” or “taxi” and
“limousine” — to determine which entities are subject to their

(2005); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th
Cir. 2013); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012); Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007); CoStar Grp., Inc. v.
LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2004); Field v. Google, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106
(D. Nev. 2006); Hendrickson v. Amazon.com, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 914 (C.D. Cal.
2003).
133 See Joe Silver, Viacom and Google Settle $1 Billion YouTube Lawsuit, ARS
TECHNICA (Mar. 18, 2014, 8:54 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/03/
viacom-and-google-reach-settlement-in-long-running-youtube-lawsuit.
134 The discussion in this section is adapted from Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory
State in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRES L. 369, 371 (2016).
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requirements.135 High-profile, platform-based “disruptors” of existing
work arrangements — including labor-matching sites like Mechanical
Turk and TaskRabbit and transportation-matching sites like Uber and
Lyft — argue that such regimes do not apply to them. Calling
themselves information businesses rather than, for example,
temporary employment agencies or transportation businesses, they
insist that, except for the people they hire to write their code and
conduct their government relations operations, they do not actually
employ anyone. Their true business, they argue, is innovation; they
are simply bringing surplus production capacity online and into a
new, freelancer-driven economy that is nimbler, more cost-effective,
and less impersonal.136 In some ways, that characterization is accurate;
platforms recruit user-workers into arrangements that are styled as
licenses to access the platform’s resources. As critics have detailed,
however, provisions in those licenses cover matters more commonly
addressed in employment agreements.137 And platforms’ self-interested
description of their operations is incomplete; they are also structures
for converting the labor of user-workers and their customers into
flows of monetizable data and finance capital. The logics of
performative enclosure, productive appropriation, and expressive
immunity work to make these functions seem both less salient and
less important from a regulatory standpoint.
Platforms also benefit from other kinds of regulatory arbitrage that
are potentially far more intractable, because they involve divisions of
authority that are baked into the structure of the modern
administrative state. The point is most usefully illustrated with an
extended example involving the ongoing dispute over whether to
impose a mandate of “net neutrality” — the obligation to “treat all
content, sites, and platforms equally”138 — on broadband Internet
access providers. Regulatory authority over the group of actors whose
actions shape the neutrality or non-neutrality of networked
135 See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2012) (“employer”
and “employee”); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 31, § 9901 (2017) (“taxicab” and “black car”);
N.Y.C., N.Y., Admin. Code § 19-502 (2014) (“taxi” and “black car”).
136 See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 110, at 96-101; Steven Hill, Uber and Lyft’s Big New Lie:
Their Excuse for Avoiding Regulation Is Finally Falling Apart, SALON (Jan. 16, 2016, 12:59
PM), http://www.salon.com/2016/01/16/uber_and_lyfts_big_new_lie_their_excuse_for_
avoiding_regulation_is_finally_falling_apart.
137 See Valerio De Stefano, The Rise of the “Just-in-Time” Workforce: On-Demand
Work, Crowdwork, and Labor Protection in the “Gig-Economy,” 37 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 471, 485-89 (2016).
138 Tim Wu, Network Neutrality FAQ, TIMWU.ORG, http://www.timwu.org/network_
neutrality.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
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information environments is both hobbled by outdated legislative
framing and fragmented by obsolete institutional design.
Important aspects of the net neutrality dispute are artifacts of
outdated statutory grants of authority. The last set of major
amendments to the statutory framework granting the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) authority to regulate
“telecommunications” dates from 1996, a year in which Internet
services were still-emergent and not yet understood as central
components of modern communications architecture and policy.139
Initially, the FCC classified cable broadband services as information
services under the statute, but after the D.C. Circuit ruled that the
statute did not permit imposition of nondiscrimination obligations on
such services and invalidated an initial set of net neutrality rules, it
recharacterized broadband Internet access providers as common
carriers subject to regulation under a different title of the statute and
then issued new rules.140 The parts of the statute that regulate
designated common carriers, however, were designed for basic
telephone service; common carriers must route all calls to their
destinations without blocking or playing favorites.141 The telephonebased communications paradigm is too narrow to encompass all of the
service-related questions that digital networked communications raise.
Internet access providers routinely engage in traffic management for a
diverse set of purposes ranging from network optimization to spam
control to network security, and some network uses require higher
bandwidth than others. Commercial Internet access providers typically
have defined tiers of pricing based on network speed and data usage
rather than on the services consumers plan to use, but also have
experimented by selectively slowing or prioritizing traffic in ways that
serve their own narrower interests.142 Net neutrality regulation takes
139 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. & 47 U.S.C.).
140 See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (invalidating the
antiblocking and nondiscrimination rules in In re Preserving the Open Internet, 25
F.C.C.R. 17905 (2010)); Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg.
19,738, 19,738 (Apr. 13, 2015) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 1, 8, & 20). As of this
writing, the Trump-era FCC is poised to reverse the 2015 rules if it can.
141 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(a), 202(a) (2012).
142 See, e.g., Ingrid Burrington, How Mobile Carriers Skirt Net-Neutrality Rules, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/12/not-everyonecan-use-the-cloud-equally/421209; Adam Liptak, Verizon Blocks Messages of Abortion Rights
Group, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2007), https://nyti.ms/2nDEKE4; John D. McKinnon &
Thomas Gryta, YouTube Says T-Mobile Is Throttling Its Video Traffic, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22,
2015, 5:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/youtube-says-t-mobile-is-throttling-its-
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aim at the latter sort of conduct, but needs to say something about the
former sort and to provide guidelines for distinguishing between the
two. The statute provides no help, and the complexity of the project
multiplies opportunities for rent-seeking.
The topic of net neutrality also intersects with questions about both
justifiable price discrimination and required public provision of
essential services in ways that allow the logics of performative
enclosure and productive appropriation to find points of entry. From
the Internet access provider’s perspective, the ability to discriminate
among different types of network traffic facilitates efforts to assert
control over the collection and use of personally identifying
information about subscribers and their online activities. The logics of
performative enclosure and productive appropriation reinforce
arguments framing such discrimination as a business necessity. With
regard to essential services, the FCC has long overseen a program to
offer “lifeline” telephone service to the poorest consumers, and more
recently oversaw development of a parallel “essentials” program for
basic broadband Internet access.143 At least some wireless Internet
providers, however, would prefer to handle the essential-services
problem via the practice of zero rating, in which usage of a designated
suite of applications is not counted for billing purposes. Such
arrangements — which, from the provider perspective, represent a
permutation of the access-for-data bargain — are more affordable, but
they are not neutral.144 The telephone-based communications
video-traffic-1450821730; Kevin J. O’Brien, Putting the Brakes on Web-Surfing Speeds, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 13, 2011), https://nyti.ms/2sOOvyb; Shalini Ramachandran, Netflix to Pay
Comcast for Smoother Streaming, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2014, 7:47 PM), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/netflix-agrees-to-pay-comcast-to-improve-its-streaming-1393175346;
Peter
Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2007, 6:32 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/19/AR2007101900842.
html; Why Free Can Be a Problem on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2015),
https://nyti.ms/1kVnEw4; Edward Wyatt, AT&T Accused of Deceiving Smartphone
Customers with Unlimited Data Plans, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2014), https://nyti.ms/ZYXrSz.
143 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 54.101-54.1310 (2016); FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, LIFELINE AND
LINK UP REFORM AND MODERNIZATION 2-4 (2016), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/FCC-16-38A1.pdf. But see Press Release, Ajit Pai, FCC Chairman, On the
Future of Broadband in the Lifeline Program (Mar. 29, 2017), https://apps.fcc.gov/
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-344129A1.pdf (asserting that states have principal
responsibility for designating providers).
144 See In re Wireless Telecomms. Bureau Policy Report, 32 FCC Rcd. 1093 (2017),
https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db0203/DA-17-127A1.pdf;
FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, WIRELESS TELECOMMS. BUREAU, POLICY REVIEW OF MOBILE
BROADBAND OPERATORS’ SPONSORED DATA OFFERINGS FOR ZERO RATED CONTENT AND SERVICES
(2017),
https://www.fcc.gov/document/release-report-policy-review-mobile-zero-ratingpractices; Klint Finley, The FCC OK’s Streaming for Free — but Net Neutrality Will Pay,

188

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 51:133

paradigm also does not easily encompass these types of questions. An
ideal enabling statute for the modern FCC would acknowledge the full
range of considerations that attend the provision of Internet access
and provide guidance on how to weigh them.
More fundamentally still, the current regulatory structure does not
permit any regulator to consider the full group of actors whose
activities determine the neutrality or nonneutrality of access to
networked digital communications capabilities. The FCC-issued rules
applied straightforwardly to broadband and wireless Internet
providers, with some exceptions for certain voice-over-Internet
services, and not at all to platforms like Facebook and Twitter that do
not provide Internet access.145 If the question is whether an entity
provides telecommunications services of the general sort contemplated
by Congress in the most recent iteration of the statute, those
distinctions may make sense; if the question is whether platforms’ selfinterested mediation of the networked information environment ought
to be subject to some basic nondiscrimination obligations, they seem
both arbitrary and laughable. Platforms and their government relations
firms have exploited the apparent unfairness; for example, Google has
adopted the posture of a supplicant seeking nondiscriminatory access
to connection points for its Google Fiber initiative, even though it and
other dominant platform firms “already benefit from what are
essentially internet fast lanes, and this has been the case for years.”146
Proposals to create a regulatory authority empowered to impose
comparable neutrality obligations on search providers, meanwhile,
WIRED (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/fcc-oks-streaming-free-netneutrality-will-pay. See generally Arturo J. Carrillo, Having Your Cake and Eating It Too?
Zero-Rating, Net Neutrality, and International Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 364 (2016).
145 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 8.2-8.11 (2016); see also Protecting and Promoting the Open
Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,738, 19,741-42 (Apr. 13, 2015) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R.
pt. 1, 8, & 20) (“The open Internet rules described above apply to both fixed and
mobile broadband Internet access service . . . . This Order [also] recognizes that some
data services — like facilities-based VoIP offerings, heart monitors, or energy
consumption sensors — may be offered by a broadband provider but . . . are not
broadband Internet access service.”).
146 Robert McMillan, What Everyone Gets Wrong in the Debate over Net Neutrality,
WIRED (June 23, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/06/net_neutrality_missing; see
Alistair Barr, Google Strikes an Upbeat Note with FCC on Title II, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2014,
4:12 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/12/31/google-strikes-an-upbeat-note-with-fccon-title-ii. See generally Letter from Austin C. Schlick, Dir. of Commc’ns Law, Google, to
Marlene H. Dortch, Sec’y, FCC (Dec. 30, 2014), https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/100319291940/
2016-10-03%20Google%20Letter%20(WC%2016-106).pdf; Ryan Singel, Now That It’s in
the Broadband Game, Google Flip-Flops on Network Neutrality, WIRED (July 30, 2013),
https://www.wired.com/2013/07/google-neutrality.
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have drawn criticism from commentators all along the political
spectrum.147
A final group of problems involves platform conduct that is simply
intractable using conventional regulatory methodologies. Debates
about the need for antitrust oversight of platform-based environments
are one example. As we saw in Part I, the economics of two-sided
markets differ in important ways from those of traditional, one-sided
markets. Because platforms can define terms for each user group
separately, pricing is not a reliable sign of market power in two-sided
markets, and secondary heuristics such as the competition regulator’s
basic distinction between horizontal and vertical integration strategies
also do not translate well to the platform-based environment. The
complexity and opacity of platform-based, massively-intermediated
exchange structures have stymied courts and policymakers used to
working with more traditional economic models.148 Competition
regulators in the European Union, who have tangled more aggressively
with the dominant platform firms, have made more progress toward
developing new methodologies for determining when platform-related
advantages ripen into market harms.149
147 See generally Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission?
Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149
(2008); Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an
Unintermediated Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697 (2010); James Grimmelmann,
Don’t Censor Search, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 48 (2007), http://www.yalelawjournal.
org/forum/dont-censor-search (arguing against the regulation of search providers);
Berin Szoka, First Amendment Protection of Search Algorithms as Editorial Discretion,
TECH. LIBERATION FRONT (June 4, 2009), https://techliberation.com/2009/06/04/
first-amendment-protection-of-search-algorithms-as-editorial-discretion (arguing that
because search providers are public companies they should be subject to public
regulations). But see Frank Pasquale, Dominant Search Engines: An Essential Cultural &
Political Facility, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET
401, 401-02 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 2010) (“I now see that [our article,]
Federal Search Commission, like many other parts of the search engine accountability
literature, tried too hard to shoehorn a wide variety of social concerns about search
engines into the economic language of antitrust policy. It is now time for scholars and
activists to move beyond the crabbed vocabulary of competition law to develop a
richer normative critique of search engine dominance.”).
148 For discussions of the difficulties that attend antitrust modeling of two- and
multi-sided markets and reviews of the literature, see generally Evans & Schmalensee,
supra note 32; Khan, supra note 33; Rochet & Tirole, supra note 32.
149 See, e.g., Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google
€2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to
Own Comparison Shopping Service (June 27, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-17-1784_en.htm; Daniel Boffey, Google Fined Record €2.4bn by EU over
Search Results, GUARDIAN (June 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/
technology/gmail-ads.html?mcubz=3. See generally Martens, supra note 35.
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An even thornier example of methodological intractability involves
rules intended to ensure that flows of information about the goods,
services, and capabilities on offer are accurate and unbiased — for
example, rules for consumer protection and investor protection and
rules prohibiting invidious discrimination in employment, finance,
and housing markets. Such rules are premised on the assumptions that
information is scarce and costly to obtain and convey, and that
regulatory mandates therefore can produce meaningful changes in the
nature and quality of information available to or about market
participants. The platform-based environment, however, is
characterized by both information abundance and endemic
information asymmetry. Those conditions make information-forcing
rules easy to manipulate and information-blocking rules easy to evade.
For example, to enforce existing antidiscrimination laws effectively,
the various agencies with enforcement authority need the ability to
detect and prove discrimination, yet that task is increasingly difficult
when decisions about lending, employment, and housing are made via
complex algorithms used to detect patterns in masses of data and the
data itself reflects preexisting patterns of inequality.150 Consumer
protection regulators typically seek both to require disclosure of
material information and to prevent marketing practices that are
unfair or deceptive, but within platform environments, consumer
awareness is easy to manipulate more directly, and many goods and
services are amenable to versioning using price discrimination
frameworks designed to appeal to what is known or inferred about
consumer preferences.151
These are genuinely difficult problems; the existing regulatory
toolkit is poorly adapted for scrutinizing algorithmic models and
methods, and the techniques for machine learning and artificial
intelligence on which platforms increasingly rely are even less
amenable to explanation and oversight.152 But encounters between
150 See generally Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104
CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016).
151 See generally Hal R. Varian, Versioning Information Goods, in INTERNET
PUBLISHING AND BEYOND: THE ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL INFORMATION AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 190 (Brian Kahin & Hal R. Varian eds., 2000); Ryan Calo, Digital Market
Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014); Andrew D. Gershoff, Ran Kivetz &
Anat Keinan, Consumer Response to Versioning: How Brands’ Production Methods Affect
Perceptions of Unfairness, 39 J. CONSUMER RES. 382 (2012); Lauren Willis, PerformanceBased Consumer Regulation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1321-26 (2015) (summarizing
research on consumer manipulation).
152 See generally Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and
Regulation in a Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669 (2010); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank
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platforms and regulators also have been profoundly shaped by tacit
understandings of the baseline entitlements that platforms enjoy.
According to the logic of productive appropriation, it makes sense that
unfettered information processing should be the default and
restrictions the exception. According to the logics of performative
enclosure and expressive immunity, the idea of accountability for
modern “information laboratories” is easy to frame as unjust and its
advocates as petulant whiners.153 These now-habitual ways of framing
regulatory discussion militate in favor of governance according to
voluntary, “best practice” standards and diminish the incentive to
develop new and appropriately rigorous methods of public
oversight.154
C. Your Laws Have No Meaning Here: Platforms and Fundamental
Rights
For some commentators on the emerging platform economy, the
prospect of continued and ever more severe regulatory destabilization
is a joyous one — a necessary period of disruption en route to a more
perfectly free (and substantially deregulated) digital future. Although
many digital entrepreneurs and pundits self-identify as iconoclasts,
that view of the digital networked world has become their own version
of conventional and unquestioned wisdom. Writing at the dawn of the
digital era, self-appointed cyber-philosopher John Perry Barlow
proclaimed cyberspace to be a new domain of pure freedom.
Addressing the nations of the world, he proclaimed: “Your legal
concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and context do
not apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is no matter
here.”155 In the era of the platform, that statement has proved
Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1
(2014); Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, The Law of the Test: Performance-Based
Regulation and Diesel Emissions Control, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 33 (2017); Joshua A. Kroll
et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017).
153 See, e.g., Larry Downes, A Rational Response to the Privacy “Crisis,” CATO INST.
POL’Y ANALYSIS, Jan. 7, 2013, at 1, http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/
pa716.pdf; Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, Targeted Online Advertising: What’s the Harm
and Where Are We Heading?, PROGRESS ON POINT, June 2009, at 1, http://www.pff.org/
issues-pubs/pops/2009/pop16.2targetonlinead.pdf.
154 See generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543 (2000); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); David
Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294 (2006).
155 John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence.
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prescient in a way that Barlow perhaps did not intend. The “legal
concepts” that increasingly have no meaning in online environments
include the guarantees that supposedly protect the fundamental rights
of Internet users, including the expressive and associational freedoms
whose supremacy Barlow asserted.
Within domestic and international discourses about fundamental
rights, the paradigmatic legal guarantees are those that bind sovereign
states in their dealings with their own citizens. State-centered
conceptions of protection and enforceability sit uneasily alongside a
reality in which flows of information to, from, and about network
users are intermediated by privately owned and operated information
platforms, and in which those flows as a practical matter define those
individuals’ expressive, associational, and commercial experiences and
opportunities.
Concern about the unaccountability of private economic power is a
longstanding theme within human rights scholarship and activism. In
2008, the United Nations Secretary-General appointed a Special
Representative to supervise the development of a framework and a set
of guiding principles intended to nudge multinational corporations
toward behavior more consistent with existing human rights norms.156
The United Nations also has sponsored a series of special reports
dealing with the power of information intermediaries and the threats
that counterterrorism efforts pose to fundamental rights and
liberties.157 Guiding principles and special reports have no
independent legal force, however, and the reports have served only to
156 See generally John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General),
Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing
the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31
(Mar. 21, 2011).
157 See generally, e.g., Ben Emmerson, General Assembly, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
While Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/70/371 (Sept. 18, 2015); David Kaye, Human
Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/32 (May 22, 2015);
Ben Emmerson, General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism,
U.N. Doc. A/69/397 (Sept. 23, 2014); Frank La Rue, Human Rights Council, Report of
the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion
and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17, 2013); Frank La Rue, Human Rights
Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011); Martin
Scheinin, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/37 (Dec. 28, 2009).
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underscore the extent of the disconnect. Within U.S. constitutional
discourse, matters are even more complicated because platform firms
also are conceptualized as rights-bearing entities, sheltered from the
full weight of accountability for their users’ rights by the logic of
expressive immunity described in Part II.C.158
In the wake of the Snowden revelations about the U.S.-driven
cooptation of privately operated networked communication
infrastructures for mass surveillance, the power of information
platforms has become a topic of broader concern. As noted in Part
II.D, above, a coalition of platform firms, academics, and human rights
NGOs, had earlier founded the Global Network Initiative in an
attempt both to counter censorship demands made by certain
countries and to respond to criticisms levied at platforms for acceding
to such demands. The initiative’s website proudly proclaims: “Privacy
is a human right and guarantor of human dignity. Privacy is important
to maintaining personal security, protecting identity and promoting
freedom of expression in the digital age.”159 The documents leaked by
Snowden, however, revealed both traditional telecommunications
providers and platform firms to be essential participants in ongoing
and seemingly lawless government surveillance operations.
Post-Snowden, platform firms have worked hard to restore and
burnish their civil libertarian public personae, filing lawsuits to
challenge government production requests and developing a “warrant
canary” system to circumvent the gag orders that customarily
accompany such requests.160 Unquestionably, that resistance
sometimes has helped to frame questions about the legality of such
operations for judicial and legislative review. Some academic
commentators now argue that communications platforms —
158 For a more detailed discussion of the disconnects involved in viewing platforms
as both speakers and speech facilitators, see generally Cohen, The Zombie First
Amendment, supra note 87, at 1122-28; Grimmelmann, supra note 147.
159 GLOB. NETWORK INITIATIVE, GNI PRINCIPLES ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND
PRIVACY 3 (2011), http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/GNI-Principleson-Freedom-of-Expression-and-Privacy_0.pdf.
160 See, e.g., In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled and
Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016); In re Search of Info.
Associated with [Redacted] @gmail.com That Is Stored at Premises Controlled by
Google, Inc., No. 16-mj-757 (GMH), 2017 WL 2480752 (D.D.C. June 2, 2017); In re
Info. Associated with One Yahoo Email Address That Is Stored at Premises Controlled
by Yahoo, No. 17–M–1234, No. 17–M–1235, 2017 WL 706307 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 21,
2017); see also Niva Elkin-Koren & Eldar Haber, Governance by Proxy: Cyber
Challenges to Civil Liberties, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 149 (2016); Naomi Gilens, The
NSA Has Not Been Here: Warrant Canaries as Tools for Transparency in the Wake of the
Snowden Disclosures, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 525, 529-30 (2015).
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“surveillance intermediaries,” to borrow Alan Rozenshtein’s
terminology — fulfill an important separation of powers function
without which the potential for surveillance abuses by the state would
be far greater.161 Others, more skeptical, observe that platforms
challenge only a very small number of the orders they receive.162
Even as the idea of “surveillance intermediaries” surfaces one set of
important dynamics surrounding the conduct of surveillance
operations, moreover, it persistently obscures others. Platform firms
are intermediaries for government surveillance, but they are also
surveillance principals in their own right. So, for example, Google has
led the industry campaign against government information collection
via secret national security letters, but also has continued to amass a
formidable database linking Gmail users to their Internet activities and
Android users to their geographic movements and mobile device usage
patterns, and it has pursued a series of ventures in artificial
intelligence — ranging from digital assistants to smart thermostats to
portable virtual reality headsets — designed to extend its reach into
other areas of users’ lives.163 Its decision to stop scanning the contents
of emails sent and received within Gmail — initially in response to
demands by paying corporate “G Suite” clients seeking better security
for their own secrets — leaves its other surveillance initiatives in
place.164 Facebook offers securely encrypted chat via its WhatsApp
161 Rozenshtein, supra note 109; see also Samuel J. Rascoff, Presidential Intelligence,
129 HARV. L. REV. 633, 662-64 (2016).
162 See generally Avidan Y. Cover, Corporate Avatars and the Erosion of the Populist
Fourth Amendment, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1441 (2015).
163 See Laurie Beaver, Google Assistant Is Coming to Audi, Volvo, BUS. INSIDER (May 16,
2017, 12:46 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/google-assistant-is-coming-to-audivolvo-2017-5; Jayson DeMers, Is ‘Google Now’ the Future of Mobile Search?, FORBES (Oct. 6,
2014, 11:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jaysondemers/2014/10/06/is-google-nowthe-future-of-mobile-search; Samuel Gibbs, Google Introduces the Biggest Algorithm Change
in Three Years, GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2013, 7:33 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2013/sep/27/google-biggest-algorithm-change-hummingbird; Mark Gurman &
Mark Bergen, Google to Push AI Smarts to iPhone, New Photo Books Service, BLOOMBERG
TECH. (May 16, 2017, 3:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0516/google-to-push-ai-smarts-to-iphone-new-photo-books-service; Tess Townsend, Google
I/O 2017: Everything Important That Google Announced Today, RECODE (May 17, 2017,
3:52 PM), https://www.recode.net/2017/5/17/15654076/google-io-biggest-announcementskeynote-highlights-2017; Tess Townsend, Google I/O 2017: Expect a Clearer Understanding
of Google’s ‘AI First’ Future, RECODE (May 16, 2017, 6:05 PM), https://www.recode.
net/2017/5/16/15648392/google-io-2017-developers-conference-sundar-pichai-homeassistant-tensorflow-vr; Kim Zetter, Google Takes on Rare Fight Against National Security
Letters, WIRED (Apr. 4, 2013, 1:02 PM), https://www.wired.com/2013/04/google-fights-nsl.
164 See Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google Will No Longer Scan Email for Ad Targeting,
N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/technology/gmail-
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service but also has repurposed user “likes” as product and event
advertising, provided facial recognition technology to help users tag
friends and acquaintances in photos uploaded by others, and
manipulated its news feed to study and monetize users’ emotional
responses.165 As described in Part I.E, above, the massive advertising
ecosystems constructed by Google and Facebook, with their capacity
for automated, personalized targeting and their corresponding
amenability to gaming and manipulation, have contributed
importantly to the contemporary climate of political polarization and
distrust. Apple has offered secure end-to-end encryption for text
messages sent via its iMessage service and for users’ emails, photos,
and contact lists, but collects a wide range of other information about
iPhone users and about users of its MacOS operating system, and it
has implemented technology to enable push notifications to iPhone
owners from merchants whose establishments they happen to be
passing.166 Amazon’s natural language-based digital assistant, Alexa,
offers users comprehensive management of their online searches,
transactions, and entertainment experiences.167
ads.html.
165 See Robert Booth, Facebook Reveals News Feed Experiment to Control Emotions,
GUARDIAN (June 29, 2014, 7:57 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jun/
29/facebook-users-emotions-news-feeds; Andy Greenberg, WhatsApp Just Switched On Endto-End Encryption for Hundreds of Millions of Users, WIRED (Nov. 18, 2014, 10:54 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2014/11/whatsapp-encrypted-messaging; Drew Guarini, Facebook
Finally Axes Controversial ‘Sponsored Stories’ Ads, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 10, 2014, 9:50
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/10/facebook-sponsored-storie_n_4574644.
html; Jessica Guynn, Privacy Implications of Facial Recognition Back in the Spotlight, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 3, 2013, 11:06 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tnprivacy-implications-of-facial-recognition-back-in-the-spotlight-20131203-story.html; Sam
Levin, Facebook Told Advertisers It Can Identify Teens Feeling ‘Insecure’ and ‘Worthless,’
GUARDIAN (May 1, 2017, 3:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/
may/01/facebook-advertising-data-insecure-teens.
166 See David E. Sanger & Brian X. Chen, Signaling Post-Snowden Era, New iPhone Locks
Out N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/
technology/iphone-locks-out-the-nsa-signaling-a-post-snowden-era-.html; Ashkan Soltani
& Craig Timberg, Apple’s Mac Computers Can Automatically Collect Your Location
Information, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2014/10/20/apples-mac-computers-can-automatically-collect-your-locationinformation; Kyle Van Hemert, 4 Reasons Why Apple’s iBeacon Is About to Disrupt Interaction
Design, WIRED (Dec. 11, 2013, 9:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/12/4-use-cases-foribeacon-the-most-exciting-tech-you-havent-heard-of.
167 See Grant Clauser, What Is Alexa? What Is the Amazon Echo, and Should You Get
One?, WIRECUTTER, http://thewirecutter.com/reviews/what-is-alexa-what-is-the-amazonecho-and-should-you-get-one (last updated Sept. 5, 2017); Echo & Alexa Devices, AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-Echo-And-Alexa-Devices/b/ref=sv_devicesubnav_0?ie=
UTF8&node=9818047011 (last visited Sept. 18, 2017).
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At no point have these and other platform companies publicly
acknowledged the extent to which their own commercial interests and
behaviors make them complicit in the construction of the surveillance
society in which their customers now find themselves enmeshed. To
the contrary, when policymakers and commentators attempt to direct
attention to the ways that the platform business model undermines
user rights and amplifies organized hate and political dysfunction,
platforms are quick to invoke the logics of appropriative privilege and
expressive immunity. In the United States, those logics now dominate
regulatory and policy discussions about online privacy and freedom of
expression. In European legal and policy debates, where those logics
are more actively contested, platform firms have worked hard to shift
the dominant frameworks in their favor. So, for example, Google
bitterly criticized the initial articulations of the “right to be forgotten”
by jurists and officials. Relying heavily on the trope of the information
laboratory as an engine of neutral truth production, it characterized
takedown requests as efforts to subtract information from the
historical record, making the remaining information less authentic and
complete.168 In the media, it also pursued a strategy of widely
publicizing the inevitable outrageous requests while barely
acknowledging the many legitimate ones.169 Reading the headlines,
one would not understand that both the European Court of Justice
and the European Commission had clearly articulated the need to
consider public interests in freedom of speech and access to

168 See Peter Fleischer, Reflecting on the Right to Be Forgotten, GOOGLE: GOOGLE EUR.
(Dec. 9, 2016), https://blog.google/topics/google-europe/reflecting-right-be-forgotten; Lila
Tretikov, European Court Decision Punches Holes in Free Knowledge, WIKIMEDIA BLOG (Aug.
6, 2014), https://blog.wikimedia.org/2014/08/06/european-court-decision-punches-holesin-free-knowledge.
169 See Natasha Lomas, Google Super Successful at Spinning Europe’s Right To Be
Forgotten Ruling as Farce, TECHCRUNCH (July 4, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/
07/04/digital-theatre; Natasha Lomas, Wikimedia Attacks Europe’s Right To Be Forgotten
Ruling as Threat to Its Mission, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 6, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/
2014/08/06/wikimedia-rtbf; Rose Powell, ‘Right to Be Forgotten’: BBC, The Guardian, Daily
Mail Push Back on Google, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (July 3, 2014), http://www.
smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/right-to-be-forgotten-bbc-the-guardian-dailymail-push-back-on-google-20140703-zsu9a.html; James Vincent, Google Chief Eric Schmidt
Says ‘Right To Be Forgotten’ Ruling Has Got the Balance ‘Wrong,’ INDEPENDENT (May 15,
2014, 12:07 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/google-chieferic-schmidt-says-right-to-be-forgotten-ruling-has-got-the-balance-wrong-9377231.html;
Kent Walker, A Principle That Should Not Be Forgotten, GOOGLE: GOOGLE EUR. (May 19,
2016), http://googlepolicyeurope.blogspot.co.uk/2016/05/a-principle-that-should-not-beforgotten.html.
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information, and also had carefully distinguished between linking and
indexing by search engines and archiving by originating sites.170
While resisting greater formal control by courts and legislatures,
platform companies also have invoked the logics of performative
enclosure and fiat interdiction to justify their own restructuring of
information flows. By the time the first wave of debates about
delinking and erasure began to fade, Google itself had put in place
proprietary takedown procedures that performed the very same role it
had claimed was both impossible and unwise.171 Emerging public
relations and governance strategies being developed by Facebook and
Google for responding to the spread of “fake news,” organized hate,
malicious manipulations of the online advertising ecosystem, and
terrorist content seem poised to follow a similar path.172
To similar effect, two of the principal strategies that have been
deployed to check national security surveillance simply shift the
balance of surveillance power in favor of privately operated
communications platforms. This first strategy involves control over
data retention. Post-Snowden, Congress enacted legislation narrowing
the
government’s
authority
to
request
production
of
telecommunications metadata, requiring such requests to be
170 See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos
(AEPD), ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 ¶ 81, 85-86 (2014); ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY,
GUIDELINES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
JUDGMENT ON ‘GOOGLE SPAIN AND INC V. AGENCIA ESPAÑOLA DE PROTECCIÓN DE DATOS
(AEPD) AND MARIO COSTEJA GONZÁLES’ C-131/12 2 (2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp225_en.pdf;
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data
Protection Regulation), ¶¶ 65-66 & arts. 17, 19, 85, 88, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
171 See Julia Powles & Enrique Chaparro, How Google Determined Our Right to Be
Forgotten, GUARDIAN (Feb. 18, 2015, 2:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/feb/18/the-right-be-forgotten-google-search.
172 See Lee, supra note 108; Levin, supra note 108; Davey Alba, Google Goes After Bad
Ads and Bad Sites That Profit from Them, WIRED (Jan. 25, 2017, 9:00 AM),
http://www.wired.com/2017/01/google-goes-bad-ads-bad-sites-profit; Monika Bickert &
Brian Fishman, Hard Questions: How We Counter Terrorism, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM (June
15, 2017), http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/06/how-we-counter-terrorism; Amber
Jamieson & Olivia Solon, Facebook to Begin Flagging Fake News in Response to Mounting
Criticism, GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2017, 12:07 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2016/dec/15/facebook-flag-fake-news-fact-check; Adam Mosseri, News Feed
FYI: Addressing Hoaxes and Fake News, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM (Dec. 15, 2016),
http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/12/news-feed-fyi-addressing-hoaxes-and-fake-news;
YouTube Introduces New Measures To Curb Extremist Video Online, GUARDIAN (June 19,
2017, 4:38 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/18/more-must-bedone-about-extremist-content-online-says-google.

198

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 51:133

structured by appropriately defined selectors and effectively banning
bulk collection.173 Self-evidently, the amendments do not limit
communications providers’ power to collect and retain data for their
own purposes, but rather depend on their continuing to do exactly
that. The year beforehand, the Court of Justice of the European Union
had invalidated a European Union directive mandating data retention
by telecommunications providers, ruling that the mandate imposed a
disproportionate burden on citizens’ fundamental rights.174 That
ruling, however, did not speak directly to purportedly consensual
platform activities that result in equally comprehensive collection and
retention of data about users.
A very different strategy for safeguarding individual rights against
abusive communications surveillance by state actors involves platform
provision of strong communications encryption. Notably, strong
encryption is an increasingly toothless safeguard for individual rights
against commercial surveillance, so even a complete shift to encrypted
communications would not disrupt the platform business model
much, if at all. As we have already seen, that model revolves around
the application of machine learning techniques to the digital traces of
people’s activities in real and virtual spaces. Communications data
provide useful inputs to that process, but those inputs are neither the
only nor the most important kinds of information on which the
platform business model relies. To the contrary, within the behaviorist
framework that animates platform logics, what people say to each
other matters far less than what they do. Even with strong
communications encryption, digital traces of what people do remain
available to the platform provider — location-based information
collected from mobile devices, sensor-based techniques for tracking
interest in physical and virtual stimuli, click-through information for
items in news feeds and social network status updates, DNS level
information for tracking web browsing, and so on. And network
architectures constructed for widespread, sensor-based data harvesting
in turn have affordances that facilitate opportunistic data grabs by
state actors.
In sum, networked, platform-based communications architectures
optimized for data harvesting and predictive modulation of
information flows leave network users simultaneously exposed to
pervasive surveillance and cut off from the institutional structures for
173 USA Freedom Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 101, 129 Stat. 269 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2015)).
174 Case C-293/12, Case C-594/12, Dig. Rights Ir. Ltd. v. Minister for Commc’ns,
Marine & Nat. Res., ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 (2014).
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vindicating the constitutional and human rights that pervasive
surveillance threatens. Those architectures also entail continuing
vulnerability to state surveillance. Platform responses to demands for
surveillance reform have produced meaningful shifts in the balance of
power, but often have seemed calibrated first and foremost to preserve
their own authority vis-à-vis threatened intrusions by government
actors. These developments are combining to constitute the space of
networked digital communications as a space devoid of protections for
vital human freedoms, even as the activities conducted in that space
become more and more fundamental to the exercise of those freedoms.
D. Resistance Is Futile?: Platforms as Emergent Transnational
Sovereigns
The broad scope of the authority that platforms exercise over their
users and their increasingly robust capacity to resist government
demands and evade protections for fundamental rights also raise a
different set of questions, which have to do with the dividing line
between power and sovereignty. Dominant platforms’ role in the
international legal order increasingly resembles that of sovereign
states. And even as they evade the obligations of domestic legal
regimes, platform firms are actively participating in the ongoing
construction of new transnational institutions and relationships that
are more hospitable to their interests.
It is useful to begin with definitions. Within the Westphalian
international legal order, a sovereign state is, most minimally, an
entity with a defined territory and a permanent population, the
authority to govern its territory, and the capacity to enter into
relations with other states.175 Within that framework, the power of
transnational corporations to resist state control has become an
increasingly thorny problem.176 Although such corporations are
nominally headquartered in particular countries and have physical
assets in many other countries that are amenable to control in varying
degrees, their great economic power translates into correspondingly
powerful capacity for regulatory arbitrage.
175 See Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat.
3907, T.S. No. 881; Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Changing Character of
Sovereignty in International Law and International Relations, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
141, 149-50 (2002).
176 See Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a
People-Centered Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (1993); see
also Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational Corporations and Human
Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 45, 57 (2002).
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Dominant platform firms fit within the narrative of the transnational
corporation as both constrained by and resistant to the international
legal order, but they also rewrite that narrative in important ways. To
begin with, platforms have both territories and populations. Platform
territories are not contiguous physical spaces but rather are defined
using protocols, data flows, and algorithms. Both technically and
experientially, however, they are clearly demarcated spaces with
virtual borders that platforms guard vigilantly.177 The benefits of those
spaces accrue most visibly and predictably to users who maintain
permanent and consistent membership. Dominant platforms like
Facebook, Google, and Apple have user populations that number in
the billions, vastly eclipsing the populations of all but the largest
nation states.178
As to governance authority, the sovereignty of platforms is emergent
and performative. As we have just seen, platform firms acting in their
capacity as surveillance intermediaries actively and theatrically resist
certain kinds of incursions by nation states on their own governance
authority. In court systems around the world, platforms have
simultaneously defended against production requests for data stored
overseas and resisted attempts by governments where that data is
stored to exert control in the interests of data protection.179 In
regulatory fora, they have engaged in protracted negotiation with
competition regulators,180 transportation and labor regulators,181 data
177 On networked spaces as experienced spaces, see generally Cohen, Cyberspace,
supra note 80, at 226-49.
178 See Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1807, 1808 (2012); Apple
Inc. (AAPL.OQ) Company Update, CREDIT SUISSE (Apr. 4, 2016), http://researchdoc.credit-suisse.com (estimated 588 million users as of April 2016); Xavier Harding,
Google Has 7 Products with 1 Billion Users, POPULAR SCI. (Feb. 1, 2016),
http://popsci.com/google-has-7-products-with-1-billion-users (1 billion users as of
February 1, 2016); Stats, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.fb.com/companyinfo (last visited June 20, 2017) (1.94 billion monthly active users as of March 2017).
Chander dismisses the territory argument out-of-hand on the ground that virtual
territories do not count and argues that the staggering user numbers are irrelevant
because one can leave Facebook and because the average user has only a few hundred
“friends.” Chander, supra, at 1817-18. But leaving Facebook is increasingly difficult,
and even users who do not know one another are nonetheless bound to obey the rules
of the platform just as citizens are bound to obey the laws of the state.
179 See generally Jennifer Daskal, Borders and Bits, 71 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming
2018).
180 See, e.g., James Kanter, European Regulators Fine Microsoft, Then Promise to Do
Better, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/07/technology/
eu-fines-microsoft-over-browser.html; Rowland Manthorpe, Google Could Be Fined
$1bn by the European Commission as Its Antitrust Case Comes to an End, WIRED (June
16, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/timeline-googles-marathon-anti-trust-case-
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protection authorities,182 and tax authorities.183 Although many of
these controversies also implicate users’ rights of privacy, expression,
and association, platforms more often seem to be principally
concerned with establishing their own regulatory independence.
Speaking at a recent network security conference, Microsoft’s
president crystallized that ambition, sketching a future in which
platform firms function as “a trusted and neutral digital
Switzerland.”184 Several months later, chastising the NSA after a
powerful hacking exploit that it had developed was stolen and then
used by cybercriminals, he characterized “nation-state action and
organized criminal action” as “the two most serious forms of
cybersecurity threats in the world today.”185 Statements like these,
which position platforms as conscientious, neutral stewards of the
global digital infrastructure, set a lofty tone that elevates the more selfinterested processes of strategic positioning operating continually in
the background.
At the same time, platforms are unmatched by other transnational
corporations in the extent of the authority they wield over the day-today experiences and activities of their users. Platforms govern their
with-the-eu; Mark Scott, E.U. Fines Facebook $122 Million over Disclosures in
WhatsApp Deal, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/
technology/facebook-european-union-fine-whatsapp.html.
181 See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Uber Fights Seattle’s Push to Make It Bargain With the
Teamsters, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2017, 5:23 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
danielfisher/2017/03/16/uber-asks-can-seattle-really-make-us-bargain-with-the-teamsters;
Mark Scott, Uber Suffers Bloody Nose in Its Fight to Conquer Europe, N.Y. TIMES (May
11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/11/technology/uber-ecj-europe.html; Adam
Vaccaro, Uber Doesn’t Want Massachusetts to Limit Driver Hours, BOSTON GLOBE
(May 12, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/05/11/uber-doesn-wantmassachusetts-limit-driver-hours/wXI4yuUVRNBQZZRpog1rIL/story.html.
182 For a detailed exploration of Facebook’s dealings with U.S. and Irish regulatory
authorities, see generally William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58
ARIZ. L. REV. 959 (2016).
183 See James Kantner & Mark Scott, Apple Owes $14.5 Billion in Back Taxes to
Ireland, E.U. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/
technology/apple-tax-eu-ireland.html; Sam Schechner, Apple Hits Back over EU IrishTax Decision, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2016, 3:12 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/euraises-pressure-on-apples-tax-deal-in-ireland-1482162608.
184 Kate Conger, Microsoft Calls for Establishment of a Digital Geneva Convention,
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 14, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/14/microsoft-calls-forestablishment-of-a-digital-geneva-convention. See generally Kristen Eichensehr,
Digital Switzerlands (Aug. 28, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
185 Bill Chappell, WannaCry Ransomware: Microsoft Calls Out NSA for Stockpiling
Vulnerabilities, NPR: TWO-WAY (May 15, 2017, 8:58 AM), http://www.npr.org/
sections/thetwo-way/2017/05/15/528439968/wannacry-ransomware-microsoft-calls-outnsa-for-stockpiling-vulnerabilities.
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domains with a quiet tenacity, imposing their own regulatory
structures on permitted conduct — e.g., sponsored search results,
Facebook “likes” and “tags,” Twitter retweets — and their own
internal sanctions on disfavored conduct. They have begun to develop
more regularized internal codes for handling the latter. As Tarleton
Gillespie describes, most general purpose platforms ban or limit
pornography, representations of extreme violence, harassment, hate
speech, representations of self-harm, and promotion of drug use.186 In
processes that resemble coordinated lawmaking, they develop and
share policy guidelines and construct regulatory institutions and
practices to regularize the processes of content flagging and
removal.187
Platforms also increasingly practice diplomacy in the manner of
sovereign actors. Facebook’s privacy team travels the world meeting
with government officials to determine how best to satisfy their
concerns while continuing to advance Facebook’s own interests, much
as a secretary of state and his or her staff might do.188 Such efforts
recently bore unprecedented fruit when Denmark announced the
appointment of a digital ambassador whose portfolio focuses on
relations with the giant platform companies. That decision in turn may
inform discussions now underway in various other European settings
about the desirability of appointing new government “digital
ministers.”189
Last and notably, platforms speak with increasingly independent
voices in new transnational governance settings that play increasingly
186

See Gillespie, supra note 108.
See id.; Klonick, supra note 109.
188 See, e.g., Gwen Ackerman, Facebook and Israel Agree to Tackle Terrorist Media
Together, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 12, 2016, 11:18 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-09-12/facebook-and-israel-agree-to-tackle-terrorist-media-together; My
Pham, Vietnam Says Facebook Commits to Preventing Offensive Content, REUTERS (Apr. 27,
2017, 7:46 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-vietnam/vietnam-says-facebookcommits-to-preventing-offensive-content-idUKKBN17T0A0; Mike Swift, Facebook to
Assemble Global Team of ‘Diplomats,’ MERCURY NEWS (May 20, 2011, 12:25 PM),
http://www.mercurynews.com/2011/05/20/facebook-to-assemble-global-team-of-diplomats.
189 See Zoë Henry, European Nations Appoint ‘Digital Ministers,’ Recognizing the Clout of
Tech Titans, INC. (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.inc.com/zoe-henry/denmark-appoints-firstever-digital-minister-recognizing-political-influence-of-tech.html; Adam Taylor, Denmark
Is Naming an Ambassador Who Will Just Deal with Increasingly Powerful Tech Companies,
WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/
2017/02/04/denmark-is-naming-an-ambassador-who-will-just-deal-with-increasinglypowerful-tech-companies; cf. Youkyung Lee, Taiwan’s “Hacker Minister” Reshaping Digital
Democracy, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 23, 2017, 10:47 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/
business/taiwans-hacker-minister-reshaping-digital-democracy-2.
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important roles in the emergent global legal order. Those settings,
which include world trade negotiations and proceedings conducted by
Internet standard-setting bodies, are themselves harbingers of
institutional change.190 In such settings, therefore, the role of
platforms in the emergent global legal order is doubly under
construction.
CONCLUSION: FUTURE-PROOFING LAW DOES NOT MEAN WHAT YOU
THINK IT MEANS
In his closing remarks at the symposium that gave rise to the articles
in this volume, Professor Anupam Chander used an analogy to the
process of “baby-proofing” a home to raise an important question
about the meaning of the term “future-proofing”: Do the stairway
gates, table bumpers, electric socket covers, and so on protect the baby
from the house or the house from the baby? Does the idea of “futureproofing” law refer to a need to protect the (bright, shiny) future from
the (presumptively obsolete) legal system? Or, does it refer to a need
to protect the (precious and now-jeopardized) rule of law from the
(rapacious, continually-accelerating) future?
In both cases, neither answer is quite right. The process of babyproofing a home changes the lived experience of the baby, the family,
and ultimately of society. It engenders new industrial production
practices, new markets, and new cross-border trade flows organized
around producing and distributing an ever-growing array of essentialuntil-disposable plastic products, which accumulate in landfills and in
the farthest reaches of the ocean. It calls forth tot-sized car seats
bulked up like mini Sherman tanks and demands ever larger vehicles
that can accommodate multiple units in the back seat(s). It replaces
vigilance with architecture — and engenders different kinds and
patterns of risk-taking. A technology studies scholar would say that
practices of baby-proofing produce new actor-networks — new
190 See, e.g., KONSTANTINOS KOMAITIS, THE CURRENT STATE OF DOMAIN NAME
REGULATION: DOMAIN NAMES AS SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS IN A MARK-DOMINATED WORLD
149-66 (2010); Ingrid Lunden, How Tech Giants Like Amazon and Google Are Playing
the ICANN Domain Game, TECHCRUNCH (June 13, 2012), https://techcrunch.com/
2012/06/13/how-tech-giants-are-playing-the-icann-domain-game; Nicole Sagener, Report:
Lobbyists Heavily Influencing TiSA Negotiations, EURACTIV (Dec. 13, 2016),
https://www.euractiv.com/section/public-affairs/news/report-lobbyists-heavily-influencingtisa-negotiations; Maira Sutton, Newly Released Emails Reveal Cozy Relationship Between
U.S. Trade Officials and Industry Reps over Secret TiSA Deal, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug.
26, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/08/new-foia-released-emails-reveal-cozyrelations-between-us-trade-officials-and. See generally LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR
FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE 33-85 (2014).
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sociotechnical formations that subtly rearrange the relationships
among their participants, with ramifications that extend more broadly
and deeply than we might assume.191
So too for law in the platform-based economy. The uncoordinated
patterns of self-interested, strategic intervention by platform firms are
producing new legal-institutional formations optimized to their
various projects and goals. In broadest brush, this is as it should be;
legal institutions should change to meet the demands of the times, and
so it is only logical that the ascendancy of platforms should produce
new legal relationships and new institutional settlements. But the
details matter — and even details that seem small or not worth
remarking can engender profound systemic effects.
The full account of law’s accommodation to the informational
economy is yet to be written, and the Polanyian analogy suggests an
important stage still to come. As Polanyi detailed, the human costs of
the shift to industrialism ultimately elicited a protective
“countermovement” in the form of regulatory constraints on market
processes.192 Whether the shift to an informational, platform-based
economy will elicit a comparable protective countermovement is yet to
be seen; it is clear, however, that the platform has become a principal
vector of institutional destabilization and that some important human
costs are beginning to materialize.
The questions now on the table concern the best paths for
institutional evolution — and the extent to which legal institutions
should bend to the service of emergent economic power. Those
questions matter urgently. Law for the platform economy is being
written all around us; it is time to pay attention.

191 See generally BRUNO LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO
ACTOR-NETWORK-THEORY (2005); Michel Callon, Some Elements of a Sociology of
Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St Brieuc Bay, in POWER,
ACTION, AND BELIEF: A NEW SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE? 196-223 (John Law ed., 1986);
Bruno Latour, Technology Is Society Made Durable, in A SOCIOLOGY OF MONSTERS 10332 (1984).
192 See POLANYI, supra note 2, at 130-31.

